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The Department ofDefense (DoD) has repeatedly been accused of needlessly holding 
large inventories. In comparison, the commercial sector has drastically cut its inventories 
over the last twenty years through such practices as Just-In-Time (JIT) and cycle time 
compression. Some defense analysts have suggested that training in commercial logistics 
would change the culture of DoD inventory management and promote similar efficiencies. 
This thesis examines that idea in the context of inventory management of secondary items 
in the Navy. It describes Navy inventory structure and it examines the causes of excess 
inventory. It then discusses current training for Navy and DLA item managers and active 
duty Navy personnel, and how that training is applied at inventory control points and in the 
fleet. The thesis then looks at commercial practices and the factors necessary for their 
implementation. It concludes that training in commercial logistics practices would not 
improve Navy inventory management for several reasons. First, the causes of excess 
inventory are unrelated to training. Second, the factors necessary to implement commercial 
logistics practices are not present in the Navy. Finally, training is not a principal agent in 
cultur3.1 change since it is better suited to conforming personnel to an existing culture. The 
author recommends increased emphasis on Joint Total Asset Visibility as a foundation for 
improved DoD inventory management. 
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B. SCOPE OF TIIESIS 
The thesis' scope is limited to inventory management of secondary items, an 
inventory category including such things as repair parts, food, clothing, and medical 
supplies. It does not address end item weapons systems. This thesis focuses on excess 
inventory, its causes, and poss1"ble solutions. It discusses Navy inventory structure, 
inventory manager incentives, and inhibitors to cultural change in order to provide 
necessary background information. A full discussion of those topics is beyond the scope 
of this research. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis attempts to answer the question "Will training in commercial logistics 
practices improve inventory management of secondary items in the Navy?" To 
effectively answer this question, several other questions must also be addressed. First, 
what are the causes of excess inventory? What training is currently given to inventory 
managers, and how is it applied? What are commercial logistics practices? 'What factors 
are necessary to be able to implement them? Can these practices work in a government 
setting? After answering these preliminary questions this research tackles the central 
issue of whether training in commercial logistics practices would benefit Navy inventory 
management. 
D. RESEARCH METHODS 
The author obtained the infonnation for this thesis from various sources. 
Infonnation concerning the causes of excess inventory and inventory manager incentives 
came from interviews with item managers and their supervisors at Navy and Defense 
Logistics Agency warehouses and inventocy control points. Current Navy inventocy 
structure and supply training infonnation came from unclassified Navy documents. 
2 
Information on commercial logistics practices and factors necessary for implementation 
came from published sources. The author met with the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics) 
(J4) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Corporate Logistics) regarding overall DoD 
policies. The author also reviewed GAO reports for applicability. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
There are eight remaining chapters. Chapter IT describes current Navy inventory 
structure and the causes of excess inventory. Chapters ill and IV discuss the training 
currently received by Navy and Defense Logistics Agency inventory managers, and how 
it is applied at inventory control points. Chapter V looks at several commercial logistics 
practices that relate to inventory management. Chapter VI discusses the qualitative 
factors necessary to implement these practices. Chapter Vll examines whether these 
commercial practices could be applied to the Navy, including the impediments to 
implementation. Chapter vm ties together the previous chapters and discusses the core 
issue of the thesis: Could training in commercial logistics practices improve Navy 
inventory management? Chapter vm also includes a discussion of what training is and 
its role in organizational change. Chapter IX contains the conclusions and 
recommendations of the thesis. 
3 
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ll. NAVY INVENTORY STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE 
This chapter defines the structure of Navy inventory and discusses the concept of 
item management, then examines the Navy's performance in inventory management and 
the causes of excess inventory. 
A. NAVY INVENTORY STRUCTURE 
Naval inventory is distributed through much the same process as a commercial 
retailer. In many commercial distribution networks, products from factories are 
purchased by wholesalers, who sell only to retailers, who sell to consumers. Inventory 
visibility is lost once the consumer purchases the item, so it is not possible to tell if 
consumers are hoarding. 
1. Item managers 
Each item in Department of Defense (DoD) inventory is controlled by an item 
manager, who is responsible for ensuring that the item is available to military customers. 
The item manager is responsible for initiating, canceling, and changing procurement 
actions, tracking stockage levels, and providing customer service. Typically, an item will 
only have one item manager in DoD. Navy wholesale inventory is under the control of an 
item manager, who initiates purchases from the factory after a Supply Demand Review 
determines a purchase is necessary. Unlike the Army, the Navy no longer has a Material 
Command. Virtually all Navy item managers work at the Naval Inventory Control Point 
(NA VICP). The Commanding Officer ofNA VICP rotates between two locations: 
Philadelphia, Pa (formerly the Aviation Supply Office), and Mechanicsburg, Pa (formerly 
the Ship's Part Control Center). The item manager is a civil servant, typically on a GS 5-
7-9 track, with possible promotion to GS-11 or 12. It is not uncommon for a Navy item 
manager to be responsible for 800-1200 items. In general, the more senior item managers 
manage fewer items which require more extensive forecasting and management, 
often because of unstable demand histories. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996) 
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2. Wholesale Inventory, Retail Inventory, and Ship's Stock 
Navy wholesale inventory is stored mainly at Fleet Industrial Supply Centers 
(FISC). The Navy uses the retail inventory level far less than the other services, since 
most ships do not carry retail stock. Retail stock consists primarily of consumable items. 
Navy retail stock is held mainly on tenders (AD/AS) and aircraft carriers (CV/CVN) for 
sale to other ships, which are analogous to consumers. Once again, inventory visibility is 
lost once the consumer purchases the item. Purchased inventory is called "ship's stock" 
and is similar to a consumer holding items in a refrigerator or pantry for short-term future 
consumption. 
3. Repairables and Their Allowances 
Repairables are sent to a Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA), 
shipyard, Naval Aviation Depot, contractor or other service depot for repair. Upon 
completion of repairs, these items may be sent directly to a customer. If not needed right 
now, Ready For Issue (RFI) repairables may be held at a FISC until a customer orders 
them. Ships and stations are required to turn in retrograde carcasses, and ships/stations 
are not permitted to hold spare repairables beyond their authorized allowance. This 
allowance is called the Aviation Consolidated Allowance Listing (A VCAL) for ships 
holding aviation items, the Consolidated Ship's Allowance Listing (COSAL) for ship or 
submarine parts, and the Shore Consolidated Allowance Listing (SHORCAL) for shore 
activities holding either. The allowance list is renegotiated prior to each deployment 
cycle (periodically for SHORCAL) based upon need, changing missions and/or force 
structure, and changing failure and repair rates. Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) sets the 
levels of authorized repairables based on readiness impacts, taking into account the local 
repair capability. 
4. Navy Asset Visibility 
Navy inventory visibility currently extends from purchase orders outstanding to 
the retail level. Navy item managers do not have visibility on ship's stock, or on items 
managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or by the other services (Brennan, 
Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996). Total Asset Visibility is discussed in Chapter V. 
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5. Determining Agency Cognizance for an Item 
Not all items used by the Navy are under the cognizance of Navy item managers. 
DLA manages most consumables, as well as some repairables and items that have a stable 
demand history (see table 1, which is based upon DoDINST 4160.26M, 1995, p. 13-1). 
DLA operates six Inventory Control Points. NA VICP is currently transferring to DLA 
the responsibility for managing almost all consumable items that are not directly related 
to a specific weapons program. This transfer should be complete by March 1997. After 
this date, virtually all items managed by the Navy will be weapons program related. 
DLA manages an item unless: 
1) It is a major end item (such as a ship, plane, or tank); 
2) It is a depot level repairable; 
3) It is controlled solely by a single agency (service); 
4) It is non-ordnance nuclear (such as nuclear propulsion); 
5) The design is unstable or the item is in preproduction testing; 
6) The item has a special waiver; 
7) The item has been reclaimed; 
8) The item is a modification or alteration set or kit; or 
9) The item is for Foreign Military Sales only. 
Table 1. Criteria for DLA to manage an item. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) manages many items available to the 
military as well as other government agencies, primarily office supplies and equipment. 
Since GSA is not part of DoD, this research does not address it further. The individual 
services manage the items not under cognizance ofDLA or GSA 
6. Demand Forecasting 
Demand forecasting is a daunting task, since overall Navy demand for an item is 
often chaotic, because of the extreme variability of demand from multiple customers with 
a mixture of demand processes at work. The demand distribution patterns are frequently 
irregular, and defy mathematical models of forecasted demand (Brennan and Boyarski, 
1996, p. 3). One major driver of demand is deployment cycles that are subject to frequent 
and sudden changes. 
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7. Supply Demand Review 
All Navy-managed items are periodically scrutinized to determine if a supply 
action is needed, such as new procurement, termination of procurement actions already in 
process, or recall of items previously disposed and held by Defense Reutilization and 
Marketing Office (DRMO). This process is called Supply Demand Review (SDR). It is 
run on a mainframe computer as the Uniform Inventory Control Process (UICP) NOB 10 
module. At Mechanicsburg, SDR is done once a month for each item. At Philadelphia, 
SDR is done as requested by individual Integrated Weapon System Teams (IWST), who 
schedule it at the most advantageous time from the perspective of their workload. There 
is a quarterly review of all items that have not been looked at during the previous three 
months. (Coyle, 1996, p. 2, 17) 
8. Demand Forecasting Computer Programs 
NA VICP Philadelphia uses a computer model called Statistical Demand 
Forecasting (SDF) to determine requirements for most non-weapons program consumable 
items. SDF has been in use for aviation items since 1989. It applies the logic of 
Statistical Process Control (SPC) to demand forecasting, and is conservative in following 
trends. It uses exponential double smoothing on five years of monthly data, providing 60 
data points. It allows an item manager to set stable forecasts for items in statistical 
control, and enables the item manager to focus his/her time on items that are out of 
statistical control. SDF even allows the item manager to track requisitions by command 
Unit Identification Code (UIC), to see if one command is responsible for an unusual 
fluctuation in demand. SDF has been a major improvement over the older UICP, greatly 
reducing procurement cycle churning, and also facilitating long-term contracting. 
However, SDF can lag behind when a major trend develops. NA VICP is expanding the 
use ofSDF into program items. (Brennan and Boyarski, 1996, p. 9-10) 
NA VICP currently uses UICP for most weapons program items. UICP analyzes 
two years of quarterly data, thus providing only eight data points. It was designed to be 
responsive to changes in demand. One of its weaknesses is that it often mistakes normal 
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variation for a trend, frequently creating a churning effect of overordering and then 
cutting back on procurements. (Brennan and Boyarski, 1996, p. 4-5, 10) 
The SDR process will automatically initiate a purchase action on consumable 
items if the deficit between stocks on hand and stock required is less than $25,000 at 
NA VICP Philadelphia or $1,000 at NA VICP Mechanicsburg. The difference in 
thresholds is because the aviation items managed by NA VICP Philadelphia tend to be 
more expensive. SDR will recommend procurement actions subject to item manager 
review for all repairables and for all consumable items with deficits greater than the 
above thresholds. (Coyle, 1996, p. 6) 
9. Repairables Management 
Most Navy repairables are related to a specific weapons program. SDF is not in 
use yet for most program items, but they are scheduled for the next phase of SDF 
implementation. Currently, a UICP module called Cyclic Levels and Forecasting 
(module DOl) is used to forecast requirements. In its quarterly run, it computes levels, 
variances, and means based on forecasts. The B08 module ofUICP sets repairables 
levels. It considers demand, administrative and procurement lead times, repair Turn 
Around Time (TAT), and the rate and speed of repairable carcass return, and the expected 
longevity of the repairable. It sets a reorder level based on the procurement lead time plus 
a safety factor. It also sets an economic retention limit, below which it is not cost-
effective to cancel a procurement action (Brennan and Boyarsk:i, 1996, p. 11-13) 
10. Economic Order Quantity, Safety Levels, and Protection Levels 
The reorder level is based upon an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model. The 
minimum reorder is for two quarters of demand for aviation items, there is no floor for 
ship-related items. The maximum amount of a reorder is six quarters of demand. Safety 
levels account for variability in demand. It is determined by the item's price, past 
variations in demand, and a consideration of the risk to readiness of a stockout. It also 
takes into account the complexity and quantity of repairs that the item's history has 
shown. The safety factor is currently one quarter of demand for aviation repairables, four 
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quarters for aviation consumables, and 20 quarters for ship and submarine items. 
(Brennan and Boyarski, 1996, p. 11-14) 
SDR generates a contract termination recommendation when assets on hand are 
excess to protection levels. Protection levels are established to avoid creating churn in 
the procurement pipeline because of a slight change in demand during the month or 
quarter. The protection levels are listed in Table 2. 
Type ofDocument Protection Level 
Contract Already in Place Reorder Point+ Fixed Requirements+ (the greater of) EOQ or 
eight quarters of demand 
Purchase Request Reorder Point+ Fixed Requirements+ (the greater of) EOQ or 
two quarters of demand (at Philadelphia), four quarters of 
demand (at Mechanicsburg) 
Table 2. NA VICP Protection Levels 
B. NAVY PERFORMANCE IN INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
1. Customary Methods of Evaluation 
Navy performance in inventory management is customarily evaluated in terms of 
its stated goal of supporting the fleet. Numerically, this is expressed in three measures: 
I) Supply Material Availability (SMA): the percentage oftime a requisition will 
be filled when it first hits the system, the funded goal is 85%; 
2) Number ofBackorders (B/0): the total number ofline items for which there is 
no inventory in stock in the system, the goal is to minimize this count; and 
3) Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT): the number of days it takes for an 
average requisition to be filled, the goal is to minimize this number. DLA and the other 
services commonly refer to this measure as Supply Response Time (SRT). 
Navy inventory managers and supply personnel are trained to focus on these 
criteria, and will use them to express how well they are performing their task. None of 
these measures are concerned with generation or holding of excess material. In fact, all 
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three improve when large quantities of material are on hand. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, 
and Pero, 1996) 
2. Excess Inventory Defmed 
Each of the services and DLA define excess inventory differently. The Navy 
definition is any stock that is above the combination of war reserves, safety level, 
expected demand during administrative and production lead times, and the EOQ reorder 
point, plus eight years of demand at current consumption rates. War reserves are not a 
significant factor in this model, accounting for less than one percent ofNavy inventory. 
(Wambaugh, 1996) 
The DLA definition of excess is any stock that is above six years of demand at 
current consumption rates. The DLA model does not consider war reserves, safety stock, 
EOQ reorder point, or administrative and production lead times. (Oakley, 1996) 
Computing a precise dollar value ofNavy excess inventory is beyond the scope of 
this research. This task is extraordinarily complex because some items are valued at 
original purchase price, some at current price, and some at scrap value, so a consistent 
model is not available. Many of these items were purchased years ago or are no longer in 
production, thus assigning a price to them is largely guesswork. (Brennan, Coyle, 
Panetta, and Pero) Another factor that makes valuation of excess difficult is that 21% of 
Navy weapons systems are used by other services. Consequently, stocks for these items 
that would be excess to the Navy could be needed by the other services that use them. 
(Department ofDefense Joint Staff, 1996, p. 5) 
3. Causes of Excess Inventory 
This research has uncovered a multitude of causes for excess inventory. This 
section gives a short discussion of each and clarifies each cause with some examples. 
_Many of the examples come from other services, either because there is not a suitable 
Navy example or because the other service example is clearer. Nonetheless, the potential 
for generation of excess material in the Navy exists from each of these causes, regardless 
of which service provided the example. 
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a. Decrease in Requirements 
If requirements for an item decrease and there is enough material on hand 
to support the older, higher requirements, it will be labeled as excess. A decrease in 
requirements can result from the weapons system being phased out, reliability 
improvements, a change in operational use, reduction in repair cycle time, reduction in 
administrative or production lead time, or a reduction in war reserve requirements. 
Examples include: 
1) As Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigates were sold or transferred to the 
USNR., demand for ship-specific items decreased 
2) Strengthening the comers of ALE-39 Chaffi'IR buckets increased their Mean 
Time Between Maintenance (MTBM), and reduced requirements. 
3) As some EA-6B aircraft transition from carrier-based to land-based USAF 
support, demand for some items should decrease, because the planes will experience less 
corrosion when they are removed from a salt-water environment, and aircraft components 
will experience fewer failures since they will not undergo the shock of catapult launches 
or arrested landings. 
4) Shortened repair cycles require fewer repairable items in the pipeline that 
supports operating forces. 
5) The Navy and DLA have succeeded in reducing administrative (contracting) 
lead time. Paperless Ordering Procedures (POP) have played a large role. This reduction 
in lead time means that less inventory is required, because the item can be procured more 
quickly. If large stocks are on hand, more will now be excess. (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
6) Requisitions might be placed for anticipated operations that do not materialize, 
such as some contingency operations. This could potentially generate excess material. 
b. Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
A unit may order the wrong part because of a keypunch error, or poor 
manuals or technical assistance. Also, a supply activity may have inaccurate stock 
location files, which would result in the wrong part being sent to the unit. If the item was 
ordered correctly, the ordering activity can submit a Report Of Discrepancy (ROD) and 
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receive the correct item at no additional charge. If the item was ordered incorrectly, there 
is currently no practical mechanism for an operational unit to recoup money it has spent 
on this part. 
c. Lack of Asset VISibility 
An inability of the Navy, DLA, and the other services to see each other's 
inventories can result in redundancy. 21 percent of the Navy's weapons system support 
items are multiple use; the corresponding figures are 43 percent for the Army, 34 percent 
for the Air Force, and 73 percent for the Marine Corps. It is quite conceivable that a 
service may buy an item which another service is holding in a warehouse unused 
(Department ofDefense Joint Staff, 1996, p. 5). 
For example, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found 69 
modular radio transmitters owned by the Army and classified as excess stored at Warner 
Robbins AFB. These are dual use USA/USAF radio components, valued at 
approximately $16,000. The Army had not made these items available, and the USAF 
had not attempted to obtain disposition authority. (GAO/NSIAD-95-64, 1995, p. 9) 
tL Lack of Customer Confidence 
Operating forces may not have confidence in the ability of the supply 
system to support them, so they may hoard items, and deliberately order more than they 
need. This stems from a philosophy of"Readiness at Any Cost." During Desert Shield, 
when the Army's 24th Infantry Division deployed to Saudi Arabia on three weeks notice. 
The 24th ordered items two and three times for each requirement, because they did not 
have confidence in the system. Since the 24th was in a combat zone and had top priority 
on requisitions, this double and triple-ordering not only created excess material in the 
24th, it hampered the readiness of subsequently deployed units by taking needed items 
out of the supply system. Units deploying after the 24th followed suit in multiple 
ordering. As a result, approximately 40,000 Sealand containers were sent to the Arabian 
Gulf during Desert Shield/ Storm. About 22,000 of these were never opened. The Joint 
Staff now sometimes refers to Desert Shield/Storm as "Desert Surplus." (Biickley, 
McKee, Randles, Veilleux, 1996) In contrast, the Navy fortunately has less possibility of 
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multiple ordering of the same requirement because of powerful Supply Departments 
coupled with improved logistics infonnation. 
e. Base Realignment And Oesure (BRA C) 
As force structures contract and bases are closed or realigned under 
BRAC, demand will decline and cause excess inventory. In addition, closing a base 
almost always results in identifying inventory that is not on the accountability records. 
This happened when DLA closed its Memphis, Ogden, and Columbus depots. Personnel 
at Defense Depot Letterkenny Pennsylvania, slated for closing in 1998, stated "We'll 
find a lot of inventory we didn't know we had when we close down." (Estes, :Miller, 
Rosenbeny, and Snyder, 1996) 
Items from activities that were closed or realigned under BRAC do not 
stratify into excess for two years. This allows some of these stocks to be consumed, and 
provides continuity in the excess management process. Absence of this provision would 
cause most stocks from BRACced activities to immediately go excess, since closing a 
base increases the supply of material while decreasing the customer base. (Oakley, 1996) 
f. Support of Allies 
Support of our allies may force United States forces to hold items that 
appear to be excess. These may be from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts or from 
regional agreements. A Navy FMS example is two $45,350 electric pumps held at FISC 
Norfolk. These pumps are for destroyers that are no longer in United States service, but 
are still in foreign service. The United States holds the inventory because the nation that 
purchased the destroyers does not wish to buy these pumps until it needs them, and it is 
not economical for the United States to dispose of them. (GAO/NSIAD, p. 10-11) 
Another Navy FMS example is the A-4 aircraft that has been sold to many nations. The 
United States must retain spare parts to meet demand from these aircraft, even though it is 
no longer in United States use. (Waite, 1996) 
A good example of a regional agreement forcing the United States to hold 
excess is 155mm Howitzer ammunition in the Republic of Korea (RoK, commonly called 
South Korea). Although the RoK manufactures this ammunition, they do not store it. If 
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North Korea were to suddenly attack, the United States Anny would have to give some of 
its stockpile to the RoK Army, since RoK forces hold 3/4 of the front line. (Waite, 1996) 
g. Poor Estimates of Support Required for Initial Procurement 
When a new weapons system is fielded, the initial estimates of which 
components will break and how often come :from the contractor in an Interim Support 
List (ISL ). There is cWTently no incentive for the contractor to Jimit the size of the ISL, 
since they profit :from each additional item they can include on it. A good example comes 
:from the Air Force. The B-2 bomber ISL contained 6,000 line items. After two years of 
operational use, only 400 of the 6,000 had been used at all. (Waite, 1996) 
h. Demilitarization 
Old militaty equipment must be demilitarized before it can be either sold 
or disposed. The funding comes out of Operations and Maintenance (0 & M) dollars, the 
same dollars the setVices use to pay for current operations. In this time of tight funding, 
there is simply not enough priority to pay for demilitarization of old equipment when the 
services need the money for today's operations. 
An example would be old radar components the author observed being 
destroyed at Defense Depot Letterkenny Pennsylvania. The exact :frequencies these 
radars generate are classified, so the item must be carefully dismantled in such a way that 
it cannot be reconstructed (Estes, Miller, Rosenbeny, and Snyder, 1996) 
Another example at Letterkenny is 3,032 backpack-style riot control 
dispensers. This model is no longer in use, but it cannot be simply thrown away because 
of the potential for terrorist action. This model can be converted to a garden sprayer and 
then sold on the open market, however, the 0 & M dollars needed to do that are not 
available. (Estes, Miller, Rosenbeny, and Snyder, 1996) 
L Item Manager Incentives 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the primaJy measures of effectiveness 
of an item manager a1I promote readiness and do not address creation or retention of 
excess material. Both in the Navy and DLA, item managers perceive that the worst thing 
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they can do short of breaking the law is to run out of stock on an item. -(Brennan, Coyle, 
Panetta, and Pero, 1996, and Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
The author observed an item manager "doctoring" demand data to increase 
the computer-generated purchase quantity from one to 40. This happened after the item 
manager had spoken with the PM about next quarter's Planned Program Requirements 
(PPR) for a newly fielded system. This particular instance is not necessarily bad, in fact 
this is precisely the kind of liaison between item manager and PM the author would like 
to see. However, if used incorrectly, this practice has the potential to create excess. 
j. Economic Considerations 
Warehouses that hold part of the National Stockpile cannot sell or dispose 
of these items by law. In addition, selling some of these items has the potential to 
devastate markets that would be flooded by the abundant supply. Consequently, the 
military simply maintains its stocks of these commodities. For example, Defense Depot 
Letterkenny Pennsylvania holds the following items in storage as part of the National 
Stockpile. 
Commodity Tons in Storage Square Footage Occupied 
Asbestos 549.9 42,966 
Chromite Refractory Ore 30,563.8 158,000 
Lead 662.5 213,000 
Manganese Ore 72,359.7 316,000 
Nickel 5,946.5 71,000 
Talc 466.9 7,161 
Tannin 13,301.1 296,060 
Zinc 8,517.5 71,000 
Table 3. Items m National Stockplle Storage at Defense Depot Letterkenny Pennsylvama 
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k. Contracting Regulations 
Unlike the private sector, the government must comply with the provisions 
of the Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) and other regulations designed to promote 
equity and social goals in government contracting. These requirements add months to the 
contracting process, thus increasing the reorder point since more stock is needed to cover 
demand during the replenishment period. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed the Navy system of inventory management for 
secondary items, and examined some of the causes of excess inventory. The next chapter 
examines training received by inventory managers, both civilian and military. 
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IlL NAVY ANDDLA TRAININGOFINVENTORYMANAGERS 
This chapter discusses training of inventory managers in the Navy and DLA, with 
particular emphasis placed upon training in commercial logistics practices. 
A. TRAINING OF NAVY INVENTORY MANAGERS 
1. Civilian Item Managers 
There is no formal training required to become an item manager, however, Navy 
item managers must have a college degree (preferably in a business major) with a 3.5 
GPA In addition, NA VICP has an optional training program called ICP Academy. 
Three times per year,"ICP Academy holds two weeks of classroom training in different 
areas of supply expertise. This is combined with a follow-on formal mentoring program. 
In addition to ICP Academy, NA VICP offers half-day training courses in specific 
skill areas. Some item managers perceive that the half-day courses are preferable, 
because these courses allow them to keep up with their daily workload while learning 
new skills. They feel that their daily routine is simply too hectic to allow them to take 
two full weeks off for training. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996) 
The two item managers interviewed in this research did not receive any formal 
training prior to assuming their positions. One had been working as an item manager for 
nine years, the other for 17 years. Neither had graduated from college; one had 
previously been a GS-5 Supply Clerk. They learned how to be item managers through 
on-the-job training and an informal network of mentors. In addition, they had taken 
advantage ofNA VICP half-day training courses. Each entered the position on a GS 5-7-
9 track at a time when item manager and File Maintenance (referring to weapons system 
item files) had separate Position Descriptions. NA VICP now blends these two areas 
together, with the trainee on a GS 7-9 track. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996) 
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2. Active Duty Officers 
All Navy Supply Corps Officers attend a six-month Officer Basic Qualification 
Course in Athens, Georgia, prior to their first assignment in the fleet. The course is 
designed to teach newly commissioned ensigns basic technical instruction in Navy supply 
procedures. The course is an in-depth study of the supply system covering topics such as 
supply manuals, personnel administration, procurement, accounting, management of 
repair parts, subsistence management, retail operations such as ship's stores and services, 
disbursing, logistics, Automated Data Processing (ADP), and supply quality assurance. 
The course is procedural in nature rather than conceptual. Students are required to 
demonstrate practical knowledge, including the ability to post all forms and files in each 
functional area. There is no specific training in commercial logistics practices such as 
Just-In-Time (ill) inventory, Material Requirements Planning (MRP), or EOQ models. 
These practices are discussed further in Chapter V. (Chief of Naval Education and 
Training, 1995) 
Lieutenants and junior Lieutenant Commanders who are en route to a billet as the 
Supply Department Head on a ship or submarine equipped with the SNAP lliiii computer 
system attend the Supply Officer Department Head Course, also in Athens, Georgia. 
Students receive a six week overview of technical functional areas such as supply and 
financial management, the Planned Maintenance System (PMS), food service, disbursing, 
retail operations, postal operations, hazardous materials management, and personnel 
management Training in commercial logistics practices is not addressed. (Chief of 
Naval Education and Training, 1995) 
3. Active Duty Enlisted 
Navy enlisted supply personnel are composed primarily of Storekeepers (SK) and 
Aviation Storekeepers (AK). The SK and AK class "A" schools are taught to selected 
junior enlisted personnel following completion of recruit training. Successful completion 
of this "A" school is not mandatory to be a designated SK or AK. However, without "A" 
school a Sailor has additional requirements to advance in rank and must acquire the 
foundation of technical knowledge required of a fleet SK or AK on his or her own. 
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The SK course is 57 days long, the AK course is a day longer. They are both 
taught at Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi. Each of these courses 
is procedural in nature, covering topics similar to the Officer Basic Course, but at a level 
appropriate to junior enlisted personnel. Hands-on training and practical performance are 
emphasized. Topics covered in the SK course include identification of the components 
and functions of the Navy supply system, performance of supply-related administrative 
functions, technical research, establishment and maintenance of stock records and related 
files, issuance of material, procedures for material receipt and distribution, inventory of 
stock, preparation of material for transfer or shipment (with emphasis on documentation, 
preservation, and packaging), preparation of requisitions, and performance of OPerating 
TARget (OPTAR) financial accounting. The AK course is similar, and adds topics in 
Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILS TRIP), squadron and Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) material control functions, and Supply 
Support Center (SSC) operating procedures. Training in commercial logistics practices is 
not addressed. (Chief ofNaval Education and Training, 1995) 
B. TRAINING OF DLA INVENTORY MANAGERS 
In comparison with the Navy, DLA has a far longer and more standardized 
training program for its item managers. Most new hires enter under the Outstanding 
Scholar Program They must have a college degree in business with at least a 3.5 GP A 
There are seven months of formal classroom training, followed by a mandatory mentoring 
period of three years. The classroom training is a core curriculum similar to that received 
by active duty Navy personnel. It is procedural in nature, but does not cover the 
commercial logistics practices discussed in Chapter V. DLA training was previously 
conducted in Columbus, Ohio, but is now available in several DLA locations. DLA 
Mobile Training Teams (MTI) teach refresher courses at DLA sites throughout the 
nation, the longest of which is three weeks. In addition, remedial or refresher training is 
available via Computer Based Training (CBT) at DLA ICPs. However, the training 
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courses for the DLA Supply Asset Material Management System (SAMMS) computer 
system are not comprehensive. Each course covers a specific skill area, and does not 
necessarily relate to the other courses. Item managers must learn to use most of SAMMS 
through on-the-job training or on their own. (Smith, 1996) 
A majority of the item managers at DSC Richmond had previous Civil Service 
supply experience and a college degree. The two item managers interviewed during this 
research with at DSC Richmond each had over 17 years experience. One had previously 
been a Supply Clerk. They are on a GS 5-7-9 track similar to NA VICP. One had been to 
four follow-on training courses taught at DSC Richmond in the previous two years, the 
other item manager had not been to any. Just as at NA VICP, item managers perceive that 
their daily schedule is too hectic to allow much time for training. Because of the defense 
drawdown, DSC Richmond had not had any new hires (except in Quality Assurance) in 
over five years. Over two thirds ofDSC Richmond's work force is within ten years of 
retirement. (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
Defense Supply Center (DSC) Richmond has adopted a Personnel Qualifications 
Standards (PQS) system based upon the PQS used in the Navy. This PQS covers all of 
the major areas with which an item manager should be familiar, and typically takes over a 
year to complete. PQS certification is not intended to be a substitute for training. PQS is 
not mandatory, but it does count for promotion points. (Smith, 1996) 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has listed the inventory training received by Navy and DLA 
personnel. All of the training discussed was procedural in nature, and did not include 
commercial logistics practices. The next chapter discusses how this training is applied to 
inventory management, both at NA VICP and in the fleet. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF INVENTORY TRAJNING IN THE NAVY AND DLA 
This chapter discusses how inventory training is applied at NA VICP, DLA ICPs, 
and in the fleet. It covers the responsibility, authority, and incentives for NA VICP and 
DLA item managers, DLA senior inventory personnel, and Navy active duty supply 
personnel. 
A. NA VICP ITEM MANAGERS 
1. Responsibility 
The item manager is responsible for ensuring that sufficient quantities of each 
item stocked is available to the fleet. The typical item manager at NA VICP Philadelphia 
is responsible for managing 800-1200 items. In general, the more senior item managers 
. manage fewer items which require more extensive forecasting and management, often 
because of unstable demand histories. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996) 
2. Authority 
Item managers work as part of an Integrated Weapons System Team (IWST) that 
includes equipment technical experts, contracting specialists, and logisticians. The 
logistics function was previously performed by AIR-412 at Naval Air Systems 
Command. Together, this team makes decisions about the items they manage. The intent 
of IWST is to avoid making decisions in a vacuum, such as engineers proposing changes 
that cannot be supported logistically, or contracting specialists procuring items that will 
soon be obsolete. (Wambaugh, 1996) 
Item managers have considerable latitude to take the supply actions necessary to 
satisfy fleet requirements. They can initiate purchase requests, request termination or 
cutback of purchase requests, retain items in Navy warehouses to stop them from being 
excessed, and can contact DRMO to recall items already excessed for disposal/ 
reutilization. IWST members frequently contact a weapons PM concerning items they 
manage, asking about program changes, item modifications, and Planned Program 
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Requirements (PPR) for new weapons systems. PPR can dictate placing a purchase order 
when demand data is insufficient 
For small dollar value purchase orders ( consumables with a total cost less than 
$25,000 at Philadelphia and $1,000 at Mechanicsburg), UICP and SDF computer 
programs initiate purchase orders during SDR For larger dollar values, the computer 
only recommends supply actions; the item manager can modifY or override these 
recommendations based upon personal judgement Item managers must be cognizant 
about whether an item belongs to a program which is "ascending" (a new program with 
increasing demand), stable, or "declining" (being phased out). (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, 
and Pero, 1996) 
Item managers utilize an electronic bulletin board called "IMNotes" to post 
special information about the items they manage. This information often relates to 
contract status or availability projections. Major Navy installations have access to the 
NA VICP database, so Supply officers can access this information electronically. This 
enables item managers to spend their time managing items, rather than on the phone 
repeating the same information to dozens of commands. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and 
Pero, 1996) 
Table 4 (taken from Coyle, 1996, p. 21) lists the approval levels for NA VICP 
procurement for each level of inventory control personnel. Note that this amount is for 
each separate procurement action There is no limit on the total amount of money an item 
manager can obligate. NA VICP has recently consolidated the Philadelphia and 
Mechanicsburg approval levels to make them consistent 
3. Incentives 
Navy item managers are motivated to support the fleet. Their effectiveness is 
frequently evaluated by SMA, the number of back orders, and ACWT for the items they 
manage. When asked "What do you do to get promotions and raises around here?" they 
responded as follows: 
I) Keep SMA high; 
2) Keep back orders and ACWT low; 
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Philadelphia Mechanicsburg 
Position $value Position $value 
GS-9 Item Manager up to $99,999 GS-9 Item Manager up to $99,999 
GS-11 Item Manager $100,000- GS-11 Item Manager $100,000-
$299,999 $299,999 
GS-12 Section Head $300,000- GS-12 Branch Head $300,000-
$499,999 $499,999 
Branch Head/ Deputy $500,000- Division Director/ Deputy $500,000-
$999,999 $999,999 
GM-15 Director/ Deputy $1,000,000- Department Director/ $1,000,000-
$4,999,999 Deputy $1,999,999 
Group Head! Deputy $2,000,000-
$4,999,999 
Commanding Officer $5,000,000 Commanding Officer $5,000,000 
and above and above 
Table 4. Approval Levels for NA VICP Procurement 
3) Terminate or cut back unnecessary procurements before they take effect; 
4) Continue education by taking courses after hours; and 
5) Take Navy training courses. 
The Navy's BOSS III Program provides personal awards for personnel who report 
overpriced items, save procurement dollars, or dispose of unneeded material. In practice, 
BOSS III awards are infrequent, so this program has not had a significant impact on item 
manager behavior. They perceive that the worst thing they can do short of breaking the 
law is to run out of stock on an item. (Brennan, Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996) 
When an item is excess, Navy item managers often hold it on site until DRMO 
identifies a buyer, since item managers are assessed a transaction charge for shipping 
excess material to DRMO (a DLA activity) of roughly $33 per line item, regardless of 
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quantity. They are assessed the same transaction cost again when DRMO moves the item 
out of its warehouse. By holding the item on site, they are only charged once (Brennan, 
Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996). 
B. DLA ITEM MANAGERS 
1. Responsibility 
The DLA concept of item management is quite similar to the Navy's concept. 
The mission ofDLA item managers is to support readiness throughout the services. The 
typical item manager at DSC Richmond manages 1100-I 800 items. This is higher than 
the typical item count for a Navy item manager, in large part because the services have 
cognizance over weapons program related repairables and consumables, which are more 
difficult to manage than the common consumables controlled by DLA (Waite, 1996). 
Just as in the Navy, the more senior item managers handle fewer items which require 
more extensive forecasting. The GS-11 item managers at DSC Richmond typically 
manage 300-500 items. (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
2. Authority 
As in the Navy, DLA item managers have considerable latitude to take the supply 
actions necessary to satisfy service requirements. They can initiate purchase requests, 
request termination or cutback of purchase requests, retain items to stop them from being 
excessed, and can contact DRMO to recall items already excessed for disposal/ 
reutilization. Managers often act upon recommendations generated by the DLA SAMMS 
computer systems; SAMMS checks twice per week to see which items have breached 
their ROP. Once again, the item manager can modify or override these recommendations 
based upon personal judgement (Nixon and Wolfe, 1996). Since DLA does not manage 
weapons-program related items, they do not concern themselves with ascending or 
descending programs. The vast majority of items they manage have relatively stable 
demand. (Waite, 1996) 
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DLA item managers have less dollar authority than do Navy managers. This is 
related to the types of items each agency manages. The weapons systems controlled by 
the services have a higher dollar value than the common consumables managed by DLA. 
Table 5 lists DLA Approval Levels for Repair, Excess, Procurement, and Cutback 
(Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
Review Levels for Supply Actions 
Repair and Excess Procurement and Cutbac 
GS-9 through GS-11 up to $75,000 up to $25,000 
GS-12 $75,000-$149,999 up to $25,000 
GM-13 $150,000- $399,999 up to $25,000 
GM-14/15 $400,000- $749,999 $25,000-$749,999 
Director/ Deputy for Material $750,000 and above $750,000 and above 
Management 
Table 5. DLA Approval Levels for Repair, Excess, Procurement, and Cutback 
3. Incentives 
There is strong consistency between the Navy and DLA in the motivation and 
incentives of item managers. DLA item managers are motivated to support readiness, and 
are evaluated by SMA, number of back orders, and SRT. When asked "What do you do 
to get promotions and raises around here?" they responded: 
1) Keep SMA high; 
2) Keep back orders low; 
3) Complete PQS, since it counts for promotion points; and 
4) Continue education by taking courses after hours. 
Since 1993, the number of inventory personnel employed at DSC Richmond has 
increased from 1,800 to 2,000, while the item count has more than doubled. This has 
significantly increased the workload per person. Item managers perceive that excess 
inventory is bad since it takes time to manage but does not contribute to their performance 
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measures. Their perception is that getting rid of excess leaves them fewer items to 
manage, helping to reduce their workload. 
In contrast to the Navy, DLA item managers do ship excess material to DRMO. 
The DLA item managers interviewed in this research were aware of both the transaction 
cost and the storage cost imposed by DLA. Since the holding cost applies whether the 
item stays in a DLA warehouse or goes to DRMO, item managers were indifferent to it. 
Their reason for shipping excess material to DRMO is to respond to the concerns of 
senior inventory personnel. Senior personnel have performance measures that reward 
getting rid of excess inventory, as delineated in the next section. 
C. DLA SENIOR INVENTORY PERSONNEL 
1. Responsibility 
In this research, DLA senior inventory personnel are defined as military 0-5 and 
above, and GM-13 and above, who are directly concerned with inventory management 
functions. These personnel are responsible for the overall leadership and proficiency of 
the DLA supply network. 
2. Authority 
DLA senior inventory personnel typically hold authority over several dozen item 
managers. They review and approve procurement requests commensurate with the dollar 
limitations listed in Table 5. Because of the large dollar values involved in each purchase 
request, DLA uses these senior personnel to ensure fiscal responsibility for public funds. 
3. Incentives 
The incentives for DLA senior personnel are different than those of their item 
managers. In addition to SMA, SRT and number of back orders, their measures of 
effectiveness (used to evaluate them for promotions and raises) are: 
1) Sales to Inventory Ratio; and 
2) Percentage of Material Considered Excess. 
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DLA's goal is to maximize the sales to inventory ratio, defined -as the total dollar 
sales from a DLA facility divided by its average inventory. This ratio is maximized by 
holding a small inventory of high demand items. Excess inventory reduces this ratio by 
increasing inventory without increasing sales (Waite, 1996). DLA tries to minimize the 
percentage of excess material held. As of July 1996, $427 million ofDSC Richmond's 
$2.78 billion inventory ( 19 .I percent) was considered excess. This was above the goal of 
17.5 percent given them by DLA headquarters. (Oakley, 1996) 
D. ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL IN THE FLEET 
1. Responsibility 
The responsibility of active duty supply personnel is to maximize readiness by 
ensuring the ship can perform its mission. The chain of command for supply personnel 
leads to a "warfighter," whether in the surface, submarine, or aviation communities. 
2. Authority 
The authority of active duty personnel at the unit level is limited. They cannot 
keep spare repairables above their authorized A VCAL/COSAL/SHORCAL. These 
allowances are negotiated at NA VICP roughly 15 months prior to a major deployment. 
Readiness Based Sparing (RBS) has generally reduced the number of spares carried 
onboard, while increasing the number of bit-and-piece consumable items needed to repair 
them. RBS has almost eliminated "insurance items" (those with a low probability of 
failure but dramatic consequences if they do fail). Since the number of spares directly 
affects readiness, supply officers try to work around the constraints ofRBS to maximize 
their onboard allowances. Tight funding and limited secure storage space onboard forces 
active duty personnel to ensure that the consumable items they purchase have rapid 
inventory turnover. 
3. Incentives 
The incentives for active duty supply personnel are virtually identical to those of 
Navy item managers. In keeping with the goal of maximizing readiness, fleet personnel 
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receive better performance evaluations if they: 
I) Keep SMA high; 
2) Keep back orders and ACWT low; 
3) Terminate or cut back unnecessary purchases before they take effect; 
4) Continue education by taking courses through Navy Campus (on shore) 
or the Program for Afloat College Education (PACE) on deployment; and 
5) Complete Navy training and correspondence courses. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined how the training discussed in Chapter III is applied at 
NA VICP, DLA, and the fleet. The next chapter covers some of the logistics practices 
currently used in the commercial sector to improve inventory. The next several chapters 
explore whether training in these practices might improve Navy inventory management. 
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V. COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS PRACTICES-
This chapter discusses some of the logistics practices currently used in the 
commercial sector. In this research, commercial logistics practices are defined as those 
techniques, methods, customs, processes, rules, guides, and standards normally used by 
business, but either applied differently or not used by the federal government (Defense 
Systems Management College, p. ES-1 ). This chapter covers the origin of these practices 
and lists those practices most applicable to inventory management. 
A. ORIGIN OF COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS PRACTICES 
Business competition is now more intense than ever. Rising costs, the frantic pace 
of business and the advent of truly global competition have forced companies to redouble 
their efforts to satisfy customers while cutting costs. Improved logistics offers a way for 
firms to differentiate themselves from their competition while reducing costs and adding 
value to their products. Andersen Consulting (Capacino, 1990, p. 2) found three primary 
factors that motivated firms to take a new look at logistics: 
The first factor is the increased importance of logistics as a part of the 
overall marketing mix. Customer service, and specifically delivery 
service, has increased in importance. Leading companies are making 
quality, and particularly quality customer service, a cornerstone of their 
business. Many companies have learned that their customers will not 
tolerate poor customer service, and that their customers will often pay a 
premium for superior customer service .... In studies across a number of 
industries, we have documented that customer service performance 
correlates closely with market share .... 
Secondly, logistics is becoming an increasingly important cost element. 
With manufacturing costs declining, logistics costs become more visible 
and more important. The full channel costs can account for 25% to 30% 
of the cost of goods sold .... 
The third factor driving increased attention to the integrated logistics 
management concept is the evolution of information technology. 
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Advanced information systems make integration of the logistics- functions 
possible. 
For many firms, logistics is the last area to come under scrutiny for process 
improvement and cost reduction. Purchasing, marketing, production, and finance have 
each gone through periods of intense focus as companies have sought to cut costs without 
cutting value. Now the same is happening to logistics. 
The vast increase in computing power in recent decades is particularly striking. 
The rise of facsimile transmissions, networked information systems, EDI, and e-mail 
have completely transformed the business landscape. No longer are large warehouses, 
long lead times, and a rigid pyramidal structure needed to operate a finn. An example of 
a modem company that has taken advantage of computers and rapid information flow is 
the Frito-Lay Corporation. Every Frito-Lay salesperson has a hand held computer that 
records each transaction made as the salesperson delivers stock to a supermarket and 
removes damaged or stale products. At the end of the day, the salesperson transmits this 
information to headquarters, providing information on sales, returns, damages, and 
inventory. While the salesperson sleeps, Frito-Lay stockage personnel refill the 
salesperson's truck, since they know exactly what to bring to the salesperson's house. 
Frito-Lay top management is able to track sales of each of its 10,000 member sales force 
on a daily basis, thanks to the power of information technology, and the salesperson no 
longer needs to reconcile a route sales book This kind of computing power and rapid 
communication could only be dreamed about as little as twenty years ago. (Applegate, 
McFarlan, and McKenney, 1996, pp. 292-349). 
B. COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS PRACTICES APPLICABLE TO 
~NTORY~AGEMrnNT 
There are a number of concepts that together make up commercial logistics 
practices. The following apply directly to inventory management. 
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1. Just-In-Time 
In traditional inventory management theory, inventory is "pushed" to stores based 
on what the manufacturer expects the customer to order. More modem systems rapidly 
"pull" inventory in response to customer demand. This requires suppliers to consistently 
meet short lead times and high fill rates without back orders. 
Under the Just-In-Time (ill) philosophy, inventory is not stockpiled at the 
factory. Instead, close relations with suppliers ensure that raw materials and input parts 
arrive "just in time" for production workers to use them. Inventory is frequently 
measured in hours rather than days. 
For example, Audio manufacturer Bose Corp. has used ill to reduce its inventory. 
Its suppliers are physically located in the Bose purchasing office, replacing the material 
planner, the buyer, and the salesperson. This system works for transportation as well. 
Lance Dixon, Bose director of purchasing and logistics explains (Andel, 1994, pp. 95-
102): 
We're now able to use the material in transit that's flowing from around 
the world into our plants as a routine inventory location. Most inventory 
sits on the shelf and you have money tied up in it. We brought our 
transportation suppliers on site - the manager from Roadway for trucking 
and the manager from Proctor for import/export activity - in one room 
under my transportation manager. This gives us a command center for 
every mode of transportation, inbound and outbound.· Under m IT, when 
the panicky buyer calls his brother in transportation, this elaborate 
computerization and control network allows them to find all locations 
where part number 123 exists. One may be on the dock in Taiwan, one 
may be halfway across the ocean, one may be coming into Seattle, one on 
a railcar, and one unloading in Boston. Everything happens on my floor 
space, and these companies sitting in this room can work together in crisis 
situations. 
The advantages of m are that it virtually eliminates standing inventory and its 
associated costs. The disadvantage is that a late delivery or poor quality on one 
component can stop an entire production line. 
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2. Outsourcing 
Outsourcing is the practice of contracting out non-strategic functions. This allows 
a company to concentrate on its core competencies and let other firms handle ancillary 
functions. Outsourcing often enables a company to maximize its return on investment by 
better serving its customers, and can serve as a barrier to entry for potential competitors. 
In the past, accounting, payroll, and temporary office help were often outsourced. Now 
logistics is increasingly treated the same way, as companies realize that their expertise lies 
elsewhere. Menlo Logistics is a corporation that coordinates logistics for many of 
America's largest companies. They told the following story about one of their clients 
(1993, pp. 2-3): 
The company had started in the 1980s as a small chain with a dozen outlets 
in several states. By 1993, it had grown to several hundred outlets 
nationwide. Previously, the customer allowed its suppliers to control 
transportation, sending goods as prepaid freight orders to each individual 
store. The company had no in-house traffic managers or analysts to track 
the flow of freight- which wasn't a problem with only a dozen stores. But 
the company was due for a change. Menlo's number crunchers, using 
sophisticated software models to analyze freight flow, order scheduling 
and equipment needs, came up with a plan that shifted control for 
transportation decisions from the supplier to the customer, and in the 
process, slashed transportation costs substantially .... The plan took the 
same amount of freight moving as 60,000 smaller, high-cost shipments a 
week and consolidated them to 2,500 larger moves per week, with better 
control, time-definite delivery, and inventory management than before. 
And at dramatically lower costs. 
The practice of outsourcing may go so far as to create a "virtual company", where 
even the employees are temporary hires. Virtual companies have fluid, moving 
organizational boundaries, and rely on a variety of supplier relationships to provide 
services on demand (Heizer and Render, 1996, p. 534). Mintzberg and Quinn provide an 
example of a company that out sources all of its production (1996, p. 64): 
Nike Inc., is the largest supplier of athletic shoes in the world. Yet it out 
sources 100% of its shoe production and manufactures only key technical 
components of its 'Nike Air System.' Nike creates maximum value by 
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concentrating on preproduction (research and development) and 
postproduction activities (marketing, distribution, and sales). 
3. Direct Delivery 
Direct delivery is another form of a "pull" inventory system. A manufacturer 
ships products directly to a retailer's store, instead of to the retailer's warehouse. The 
advantage is that the retailer has eliminated inventory holding costs on that item, and only 
calls for the item to be delivered to the store when needed. A disadvantage is that 
shipping costs will probably increase, since there will usually be more Less Than 
Truckload (L1L) shipments. 
While this arrangement can be great for the retailer, it can cause problems for 
manufacturers. An example of how this can impact suppliers was cited in the Wall Street 
Journal of October 27, 1995. Christina Duff reported that "Department stores are 
increasingly placing onerous logistical demands on apparel suppliers. She went on to say: 
Department stores have started to increase their emphasis on logistics. 
Take the rules about shipping. Packing labels may be required to include, 
say, eight specific bits of information. Often the label has to be affixed to 
a specific place on a particular kind of shipping box. Then the clothes 
have to be prepriced and hung, facing a certain way, on special hangars. 
And stores will accept the goods only on certain days. 
4. Electronic Data Interchange and Total Asset Visibility 
EDI is a standardized data transmittal format that enables firms to track inventory 
worldwide, providing Total Asset Visibility (TA V). Items are tracked electronically, 
typically by a scanner that scans a barcode containing the item's complete description and 
destination. EDI enables inventory managers to know the location of all company 
inventory, and breaks down the old barriers of inventory "pigeonholed" in warehouses. 
Before EDI, one company warehouse could be holding stock needed by another branch of 
the company, but the second branch would have no way of knowing inventory was 
available, so they would order more of the same part. 
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An example of a company using EDI is Sears Logistics Services. Menlo Logistics 
( 1993, p. 4) reported that: 
Vendors send an advance shipment notification to Sears by ED I. Sears' 
computer then determines if the shipment is truckload or L TL. L TL 
shipment information then is transmitted electronically to the Menlo 
computer, which responds with the optimum carrier and routing, relaying 
that information via EDI ____ Sears determines the rate and pays Menlo 
through EDI. The result is a smooth-running process with minimal 
paperwork and easy communication between shipper and service provider. 
While EDI can be a tremendous asset, one concern is that it is only as good as the input 
data. 
5. Cycle Time Compression 
Cycle time compression is a reduction in the time between when the customer 
places an order and when the customer receives the order. There are several transactions 
in this process, including order placement and transmittal, order processing, payment, 
picking the item in the warehouse, packing it for shipping, transporting it to its 
destination, and tracking its status. Automating, consolidating, or running these elements 
in parallel can dramatically reduce overall cycle time. Johnson & Johnson (J & J) greatly 
improved its cycle time as follows (Andel, 1994, pp. 95-102): 
J & J uses Manugistics, an integrated set of supply chain management 
applications, to help it meet the replenishment demands of all its 
customers. Using information from EDI transmissions, this software links 
the Support Center with J & J' s customers and distribution centers. The 
system is tied directly to the company's order management system -
which includes order processing, transportation load building, and sales 
reporting systems. Information from these systems is fed downstream to 
each of the separate operating units to provide decision support throughout 
the organization. 
By linking all of these functions electronically, J & J has slashed its cycle time, while at 
the same time improving accuracy. 
36 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter described some of the most commonly used commercial logistics 
practices that apply directly to inventory management. The next chapter discusses the key 
factors necessary to implement these practices. 
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VI. FACTORS REQUIRED FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
OF COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS PRACTICES 
Improving corporate logistics by using modem commercial logistics practices is . 
not just a matter of will or an investment in high technology. Instead, it requires a 
number of key factors to be in place for success. If these factors are not in place, then the 
commercial practices discussed in the previous chapter simply will not work. In this case, 
training personnel in commercial practices is of no value, since the practices won't work 
regardless of how much training is given. This chapter begins by summarizing two 
research efforts, one looking at transportation for a government agency, and the other 
examining m purchasing. Each factor is then discussed in greater depth. 
A. IMPROVING SHIPPING AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
The United States Department of Energy (DoE) commissioned the University of 
Maryland to conduct a study to search for ways to improve shipping operations. The 
study originated from projected increases in DoE packaging, processing, shipping, and 
delivery requirements. After compiling the results of extensive database searches and in-
depth interviews, this study found the following four elements most critical for success 
(University of Maryland, 1993, p. 12): 
Long-term partnerships between carriers and shippers .... This reflects the 
trend in logistics away from transactional exchange and toward relational 
exchange in transportation management. 
Second, ... carrier quality programs that operate through both pre-
qualification and on-going performance metrics to incorporate safety, 
performance, value, compliance, and process improvement into logistics 
management .... 
Risk management ranked third ... , and included risk identification, 
analysis, reduction, and communication .... 
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Information systems management was the fourth ranking Critical Success 
Factor. Information flow is the key to many other factors, including 
quality programs, risk management, performance measurement, and 
relational exchange. 
The identified factors are the antithesis of many past American business practices, 
and require significant cultural change. Long term relationships and carrier quality 
evaluations go against the idea of "all shippers are the same, so go with the lowest 
bidder." Now companies must work together and trust each other in a combined effort to 
lower costs. Risk management requires different corporate functions such as marketing, 
production, and finance to work together with logistics to find, analyze, and reduce risk. 
This is a marked improvement from the attitude of "That's a distribution problem, let the 
shipping department figure it out." In some companies, free flow of information was 
considered a threat, and managers would bottleneck information as a means of holding 
power over their subordinates. Now, e-mail and Electronic Data Interchange (ED I) result 
in a vastly higher volume of information going around bottlenecks. 
B. GOALS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JUST-IN-TIME PURCHASING 
Heizer and Render analyzed JIT purchasing in their operations management text 
(1996, p. 541-545). They concluded that the goals of JIT purchasing are: 
I) Elimination of Unnecessary Activities. For instance, receiving activity 
and incoming inspection activity are unnecessary under just-in-time. If 
purchasing personnel have been effective in selecting and developing 
vendors, the purchased items can be received without formal counting, 
inspection, and testing procedures .... Production can contribute by 
providing accurate, stable schedules, adequate lead time for engineering 
changes to be implemented, and time to develop ethical suppliers. 
2) Elimination of In-Plant Inventory. Virtually no raw material inventory 
is necessary if materials that meet quality standards are delivered where 
and when they are needed .... Reduction or elimination of inventory allows 
problems with other aspects of the production process to be observed and 
corrected. 
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3) Elimination of In-Transit lnventory .... Modem purchasing departments 
address in-transit inventory reduction by encouraging suppliers to locate 
near the plant and support rapid transportation of purchases. The shorter 
the flow of material and money in the resource "pipeline," the less 
inventory .... 
4) Quality and Reliability Improvement. Reducing the number of 
suppliers and increasing long-term commitments to suppliers tends to 
improve supplier quality and reliability. Vendors and purchasers must 
have mutual understanding and trust. 
Heizer and Render then categorized llT as applied to a corporate purchasing 
function into four principal areas. Their first finding was that to successfully implement 
llT, a firm needed to develop long-term relationships with a small number of suppliers 
enabling both companies to remain competitive. Stable demand in small quantities 
formed the basis of their second principal area. The third finding was that quality is best 
improved by reducing specifications and using statistical process control, not post-
production inspection. Finally, they found it vital that a company be able to control and 
schedule its shipping, particularly for inbound freight. Heizer and Render's findings are 
summarized in Table 6. 
C. DISCUSSION OF KEY FACTORS 
1. Stable Demand 
Commercial logistics practices work best with a stable, predictable demand 
pattern. Regular demand patterns produce less uncertainty, which enables both supplier 
and purchaser to effectively plan for the future to maximize productivity while 
minimizing cost. Consequently, frequent deliveries in small lot sizes are possible. This 
minimizes the in-plant inventory, and reduces stockage costs. Heizer and Render (1996, 
p. 579-581) cover these points, noting that: 
To achieve just-in-time inventory, managers reduce variability caused by 
both internal and external factors. Inventory hides variability - a polite 
word for problems. The less variability in the system, the less inventory is 
required .... The key to llT is producing small lot sizes to standards. 
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Characteristics of JIT Purchasing 
Suppliers 
Few suppliers 
Nearby suppliers or clusters of remote suppliers 
Repeat business with same suppliers 
Active use of analysis to enable desirable suppliers to become/stay price competitive 
Competitive bidding mostly limited to new purchases 
Buyer resists vertical integration and subsequent wipe out of supplier business 
Suppliers are encouraged to extend ill buying to their suppliers 
Quantities 
Steady output rate (a desirable prerequisite) 
Frequent deliveries in small lot quantities 
Long-term contract agreements 
Minimal paperwork to release orders 
Delivery quantities variable from release to release but fixed for whole contract term 
Little or no permissible overage or underage of receipts 
Suppliers encouraged to package in exact quantities 
Suppliers encouraged to reduce their production lot sizes (or store unreleased material) 
Quality 
Minimal product specifications imposed on supplier 
Help suppliers to meet quality requirements 
Close relationship between buyers' and suppliers' quality assurance people 
Suppliers encouraged to use process control charts instead of lot sampling inspection 
Shipping 
Scheduling of inbound freight 
Gain control by use of company-owned or contract shipping and warehousing 
Table 6. Charactenstics of ill Purchasmg {Hetzer and Render, 1996, p. 542) 
Reducing the size of batches can be a major help in reducing inventory and 
inventory costs. 
Toshiba has made great strides in reducing lot size. They utilize a process called 
Single Minute Exchange of Dies (SMED) that enables them to rapidly shift production 
from one item model to another, providing tremendous flexibility. Toshiba president 
Fumio Sato stated that (Heizer and Render, 1996, p. 587): 
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Customers wanted choices. They wanted a washing machine or a TV set that was 
precisely right for their needs. We needed variety, not mass production, says Sato. 
The key to variety is finding ways to make money from ever-shorter production 
runs. Sato urges managers to reduce setup times, shrink lead times, and learn to 
make more products with the same equipment and people .... Usually, they make a 
batch of20 before changing models, but Toshiba can afford lot sizes as small as 
10. Product life-cycles for low-end computers are measured in months, not years, 
so flexible lines allow the company to guard against running short of a hot model 
or overproducing one whose sales have slowed. The results are less inventory, 
less space devoted to inventory, less obsolete inventory, lower holding costs, and 
a focus on the products currently in demand 
Though stable demand is desirable, it is not usually the case in real life. It is 
certainly not the case for the Navy, whose demand requirements are driven by national 
security concerns. Small lot sizes have great potential to reduce inventory, but they are 
not a panacea. This concept can increase transportation costs since there are more 
shipments of material. Also, it requires suppliers who are capable of producing an item 
on short notice. 
2. Low Stock Out Cost 
Commercial logistics practices work best when the potential dollars lost from 
being out of stock on an item are relatively low. An example is a clothing retailer, who 
might convince a customer to purchase another item or to back order the desired good, 
knowing that the logistics system can quickly respond. Substitutability of products helps, 
because a company could use another supplier if one was out of stock. 
An example of how a high stockout cost hampers implementation of commercial 
logistics practices comes from the airline industry. An airliner that is not mission capable 
can cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour in lost revenue, so quick response is a must. 
Jim Stansbury, the Team Leader for Corporate Contracts at DSCR, examined Boeing and 
General Electric (GE) inventory practices for jet engines. GE uses the commercial 
logistics practices discussed in this research, holding minimal stock and turning over its 
inventory ten times per year. Boeing uses a more traditional inventory system with high 
quantities of material on hand, and an inventory turn of..5 per year. In 1992, Boeing's 
SMA was a consistent 99%, with delivery occurring in under 24 hours anywhere in the 
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world GE' s SMA ranged from 80-85%. Customers could not afford the low SMA that 
GE's commercial logistics practices provided, so they have increasingly turned to Boeing. 
Since 1992, GE has substantially increased its inventory in an effort to boost its SMA and 
. keep customers. (Stansbury, 1996) 
3. Long Term Relationships with a Small Number of Suppliers 
Developing long term, close relationships with good suppliers is essential to 
success. Reduced inventory means more frequent deliveries and a heavy reliance on both 
the supplier and the distribution system. Leading edge companies evaluate suppliers 
based on quality and their demonstrated ability to meet delivery schedules. 
Open, two-way communication is critical to developing the mutual trust and 
respect needed in a long term relationship. Buyers frequently share production or 
operations schedules with a supplier, so the supplier can anticipate buyer needs. Sharing 
information reduces variability and response time. Some companies go further, 
integrating suppliers directly into their logistics system. Support can include training, 
engineering and production assistance, and even work spaces inside the buyer's facilities. 
Buyers and vendors consider themselves as colleagues working together. This kind of 
arrangement enables both firms to maximize profit. Contracting costs are virtually 
eliminated, and administrative and inventory costs are sharply reduced As Heizer and 
Render (1996, p. 536-539) point out: 
Viewing the supplier as an adversary is counterproductive .... A healthy 
vendor relationship is one in which the supplier is committed to helping 
the purchaser improve its product and win orders. Suppliers can also be a 
source of ideas about new technology, materials, and processes .... 
Likewise, healthy relationships also include those in which the purchaser 
is committed to keeping the supplier informed of possible changes in 
product and production cycle .... A good supplier relationship is one where 
both partners have established a degree of mutual trust and a belief in the 
competence of each other. 
Firms have found that it is better to create partnerships with a few good suppliers 
rather than having a large number of suppliers who compete against each other. 
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Reducing the number of suppliers reduces variation in the process, improving product 
quality and enhancing the opportunity to foster a mutually beneficial relationship. Heizer 
and Render (1996, p. 539) state that: 
Companies around the country are cutting back the number of suppliers by 
as much as 90%. They are demanding higher levels of service and product 
quality from the survivors. And they are willing to pay a premium on the 
theory that getting things right initially is cheaper in the long run. 
According to Heizer and Render, Xerox has cut its number of suppliers by 90%, 
Motorola by 70%, General Motors by 45%, Ford by 44%, and Texas Instruments by 36%. 
4. ffigh Quality Products 
Quality is the ability to consistently meet or exceed customer expectations. Top 
quality is a necessity to realize the benefits of commercial logistics practices. Commercial 
firms employ a variety of techniques to improve quality, including statistical process 
control to reduce variation, continuous process improvement, and Total Quality 
Management (TQM). Heizer and Render (1996, p. 86) note that: 
Better quality means less inventory and a better, easier-to-employ JIT 
system. Often the purpose of keeping inventory is to protect against poor 
production performance resulting from unreliable quality. If consistent 
quality exists, JIT allows us to reduce all the costs associated with 
inventory. 
There is a disadvantage to relying on a supplier's quality. Since commercial 
logistics systems frequently operate with minimal inventory, there is no safety stock to 
replace defective units. Poor quality in just one item can shut down an entire production 
line. 
5. Integrated Information Systems 
Information technology is the foundation for several logistics practices. 
Companies must know exactly what inventory they have, where it is, and where it's going 
if in transit. Leading edge firms focus on integration across supply channels to build 
operating links with partners, suppliers, customers, and carriers. Information systems 
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reduce the need for inventory and eliminate redundancy in procurement. In an article on 
managing logistics in the 1990s, Andersen Consulting (Capacino, 1990, pp. 4-5) stated 
that 
Companies cannot effectively manage costs, provide superior customer 
service, and be leaders in logistics performance without leading-edge 
information systems. Advanced logistics systems involve three aspects .... 
First, timely and accurate information is essential. This requires source data 
capture ... and real time information processing capabilities. For example, a 
warehouse worker should not have to send pick documents to an office for key-
punching and batch processing, but should scan or keypunch each transaction as it 
occurs .... 
Second, integrated applications software with full functionality is a key 
part of an effective logistics information system. Full functionality will 
differ for each company but may include capabilities such as the ability to 
allocate inventory to a specific customer or lot traceability. 
Third, advanced decision support is an important part of a logistics 
information system. Capabilities in this area include logistics network 
planning models which allow a what-if simulation of the cost and 
customer service impacts of alternative logistic network structure and 
policies; routing and scheduling analytic programs which can be used to 
reduce transportation costs; order consolidation programs that can design 
the best shipping strategies; and analytic software to evaluate alternative 
inventory deployment and management strategies. 
An example of a company that has improved its inventory receiving function 
through information technology is Frank's Nursery & Crafts in Detroit. The company: 
... implemented a portable voice system that directs workers through 
receipt verification and assignment of storage location. Data collection is 
by voice and barcode scanners. All information is exchanged in real time 
by radio frequency between the voice system and the dedicated personal 
computer managing the information .... In addition to significantly 
improved inventory accuracy, the new automatic data collection system 
immediately improved worker productivity 30% .... The system paid for 
itself in only 13 months .... Workers are guided through ... verification steps 
by voice prompts generated from the system. Because receiving at Frank's 
is a decision-tree process, over I 00 potential voice prompts are pre-
programmed .... Following the prompts, workers then collect data as 
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required using either voice data entry or bar code scanning. (Cahners 
Publishing Company, October 1994) 
6. Competitive Environment Motivated by Profit 
The commercial sector is fiercely competitive. Companies that do not provide 
top-quality products and service may quickly find themselves out of business. This fierce 
competition ensures that companies keep up to date in capability and remain competitive 
on price. The logistics function in many companies is evaluated by its contribution to the 
firm's profitability. This leads many companies to seek ways to reduce inventory without 
compromising customer service, since excess inventory is expensive to maintain and 
subject to obsolescence and pilferage. 
7. Centralized Shipping Near to Corporate Headquarters 
To receive the most benefit from a logistics system, it should be centralized near 
the strategic apex of the company, so the firm can integrate logistics into the strategic 
planning process. Centralization enables a company to maintain tight control while 
consolidating shipments and lowering costs. The University of Maryland (1993, p. 9) 
surveyed 20 companies seeking best logistics practices and found that all of them had 
centralized their strategic logistics management function .... in proximity 
to the corporate center. This pattern contributed to company-wide 
planning and organizational activities. All cited increased control, 
improved efficiencies, and lowered costs as the primary motivations 
behind their centralization philosophy. 
They gave the example of Pfizer Pharmaceutical (p. 9): 
Pfizer discovered that by centrally pooling shipping demand, consolidating 
freight, streamlining administrative procedures, and integrating its 
information systems, its logistics function could be more productive while 
achieving considerable savings. Company-wide carrier rates were 
established through negotiations and corporate policies. Using the buying 
power gained from aggregated demand, they were able to [get] a lower 
national rate from Yellow Freight Systems than the individual business 
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units had managed to achieve. Procurement costs also fell as economies of 
scale allowed higher discounts and lower unit prices. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown some of the prerequisites for implementing commercial 
logistics practices. It has demonstrated through a host of examples that implementation 
requires careful planning and a specific set of key factors. It has also shown that some of 
these logistics practices can be detrimental if applied incorrectly. The author cannot 
emphasize strongly enough that if these factors are not in place, all the personnel training 
iii the world will not make these commercial practices work. The next chapter looks at 
whether DoD's operating environment has the characteristics necessary to implement 
commercial logistics practices. 
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Vll. DIFFERENCES BE1WEEN THE NAVY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
Navy inventory management differs from the commercial sector in several 
respects. This chapter discusses some of the factors contributing to these differences. 
Many of these factors inhibit the Navy from behaving like a commercial firm and · 
adopting commercial logistics practices. Because of these differences, training in 
commercial logistics practices would serve no purpose, since the environment necessary 
for its implementation is not present. 
A. UNPREDICTABLE DEMAND 
Unlike the commercial sector, Navy inventory requirements are driven by national 
security commitments. There is no forecasting model that can predict next year's demand 
for the Navy's services. Since foreign crises frequently flare up with no warning, each 
one is a "Come as you are" situation. The military must be in a constant state of 
readiness. Many critical components used in Navy weapons systems have lead times of 
over a year that cannot be significantly reduced, even with additional funding. A wartime 
inventory model is completely different from that of peacetime. As a result, the Navy 
must maintain stocks of items it may never use as insurance against the threat of a foreign 
crisis. 
B. IDGH STOCK OUT COST 
In the commercial sector, the cost of a stock out can be estimated in dollars, 
derived from a combination of lost revenue, back ordering costs, and lost customers. This 
is not the case for defense items. Naval forces must be ready to respond on a moment's 
notice to a crisis anywhere in the world. The cost of running out of stock on an item is 
sometimes measured in lives, perhaps even thousands of lives. 
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C. INEXPERIENCED FLEET PERSONNEL WITH IDGH TURNOVER 
INHIBIT THE NAVY'S AB:U.ITY TO FORM LONG TERM 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUPPLIERS 
In the commercial sector, inventory management personnel typically remain in the 
same job for several years, and often stay in the same location for their entire career. A 
similar situation exists at NA VICP. However, this is not true in the operating forces. 
The typical fleet sailor is 21 years old. Personnel turnover on most ships and stations is 
over 25% per year. Promotion is rapid compared to the private sector. Personnel rapidly 
rotate through different tasks in order to acquire a variety of skills. Consequently, sailors 
do not develop in-depth experience in any one facet of logistics. The combination of 
youth, inexperience, and rapid turnover makes it next to impossible to develop long-term 
relationships with suppliers. 
Formulating an inventory management training policy for these personnel is 
difficult. There are a myriad of job tasks to which AK and SK personnel might be 
assigned. In addition, newly reported junior enlisted typically spend 90 days in a 
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) billet such as food service or laundry before 
commencing work in their rate. Consequently, comprehensive formal training shortly 
after completion of recruit training would most likely be wasted, since it would cover 
many topics the sailor would never utilize, while other topics would be forgotten before 
the new sailor would be able to put them to productive use. 
D. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REGULATIONS INCREASE 
INVENTORY BY INHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-TERM 
RELATIONSHIPS WITH SUPPLIERS 
Government contracting is quite different from commercial sector contracting. It 
is a highly regulated process defined by law, judicial decisions, and internal policies. 
Government purchasing agents serve as stewards of public funds, and are subject to high 
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accountability. Government contracting does not exist merely to buy goods for the 
government. It also tries to ensure equity in contract awards, and to promote social goals. 
Unfortunately, the objectives of government contracting frequently conflict with the 
concept of efficiency, and preclude the adoption of commercial logistics practices. 
Under the Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 and the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR), government contracting operates on the premise of "full 
and open competition." This essentially means that every contract is up for grabs to any 
firm that desires to bid on it. While competition in itself is desirable in producing better 
quality at a lower price, the government approach to competition can be deleterious. 
There is often no continuity from one contract to the next, even for the same item. 
Consequently, "CICA requirements for open and full competition may be considered an 
obstacle to the government's ability to establish and maintain commercial-like 
relationships since most contracts awards are competed individually with no 
commitments for future follow-on business (DSMC, 1991, p. 3-4)." The government's 
requirement for a rigid, formal contracting process also works against the adoption of 
commercial contracting practices: 
In order to promote and realize fairness and equal opportunity in the 
government contracting process, the government relies on very specific 
rules, regulations, and procedures in order to eliminate subjective bias in 
the expenditure of public funds. Formal rules are also necessary due to the 
numbers of personnel involved in government contracting and their 
turnover rate. This environment and the resulting practices are in direct 
contrast to an attitude of cooperative contractual agreements between 
buyers and sellers in the commercial sector. (DSMC, 1991, p. 5-3) 
As a result of the government's insistence upon full and open competition, Navy 
inventory levels are higher. Since most government contracts are awarded individually, 
the length of time required to complete them does not decrease over time. This process is 
quite long, as it involves determining the requirement, setting specifications, writing a 
voluminous contract, soliciting and evaluating bids, awarding the contract, and dealing 
with protests. Despite recent reform under the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
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(F ASA) of 1994, the tremendous volume of paperwork and regulations involved in 
government contracting make it nearly impossible to reduce cycle time, consequently 
requiring inventory levels to remain relatively high because of long replenishment time. 
E. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING REGULATIONS OFTEN RESULT IN 
POOR QUALITY, INCREASING INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS 
Contracting regulations can sometimes drive the government to purchase poor 
quality items. Although the government has a concept called "best value" which states 
that factors other than price should be considered in making a source selection, many 
government contract awards are still price-driven. This is penny wise and pound foolish, 
because added reliability or quality may well be worth a slightly higher price. F ASA 
emphasized best value as an attempt to put common sense back into the procurement 
process. The full impact ofFASA has yet to be felt. 
At present, the concept of "Full and open competition" on every bid does not give 
adequate weight to a contractor's past performance in technical merit, reliability, and 
ability to deliver on schedule. As long as a firm can barely meet the minimum 
requirements to produce an item, it cannot legally be prohibited from bidding. A firm's 
past willingness to cooperate in resolving disputes and ambiguities is rarely considered as 
an evaluation factor (DSMC, 1991, pp. 3-4, 5). The government cannot boycott 
uncooperative companies or place most of its business with more responsive firms (p. 4-
3 ). As a consequence of these factors, there is no incentive for a vendor to provide the 
best product or service. 
Some of the social goals of government contracting result in awarding contracts 
on the basis of race, gender, or company size rather than on quality or past performance. 
This can result in lower quality firms and products being selected It can also result in 
higher prices, or in purchases from a company in financial trouble that may not be in 
business when spare parts or technical assistance are needed. 
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Contracting regulations also reduce the number of firms that will bid on an item. 
This indirectly reduces quality by limiting competition. Government regulations dictate 
that a firm must offer its "best customer price" to the government. The problem with this 
idea is that firms give their best customer price based on a mutual relationship of long-
term commitment and cooperation. The government demands to be treated as a best 
customer without being willing to behave as one (DSMC, 1991, p. 5-4). 
Delays in payment and litigation are also an obstacle. The government not only 
demands the lowest price and resultant lowest profit margin, it is al~o frequently the last 
customer to pay, and the most likely to initiate litigation. Given this situation, it is 
understandable why many firms refuse to bid on government contracts, even if they could 
supply better quality products at lower prices than the eventual contract winners. 
(DSMC, 1991, p. 4-4) 
Another way that the government reduces competition is by insisting on far more 
information than the commercial sector: 
The government generally requires more documentation, such as user and 
maintenance manuals and schematic drawing packages, than is normally 
produced with commercial products. Generating these documents is 
usually a distraction for the supplier, since people are diverted from their 
usual work activities to develop them. Additionally, they are reluctant to 
provide detailed technical data about their products for fear of revealing 
competitively advantageous information. Unless a firm is in business to 
produce technical documents, requesting them in addition to what is 
normally provided with a product in different form or format discourages 
vendors from selling their products to the government. (DSMC, 1991, pp. 
5-3, 4) 
The government will frequently ask for data rights detailed enough to enable it to 
competitively rebid subsequent contracts. Companies with specialized techniques and 
processes will often refuse to bid on government contracts, since they would be giving 
away trade secrets. The government also insists on cost and pricing data for contracts 
over $500,000. This practice has no counterpart in the commercial sector, and in fact this 
information is often considered proprietary. (DSMC, 1991, p. 5-4) 
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"Government warranties are usually different from the commercial warranty 
normally offered with the product, although not necessarily more comprehensive." 
(DSMC, 1991, p. 5-5) In addition, the large volume of paperwork involved in 
government contracting often discourages vendors from bidding: 
When the government acquires an item from a commercial supplier, the 
contract usually developed is enormously detailed and complex compared 
to commercial contracts for similar items. The government attempts to 
protect itself from all conceivable contingencies through the incorporation 
of multitudinous and voluminous contract clauses. These clauses, which 
are used to ensure that the government receives a quality product at a fair 
price, are often in direct conflict with standard commercial practices and the 
Uniform Commercial Code. (DSMC, 1991, p. 5-2) 
In summary, the limited profit, late payment, lack of commitment for future 
business, requests for proprietary information, and award of contracts based on criteria 
other than price and quality all inhibit bidders. By reducing the number of competitors, 
the government indirectly reduces the quality of items it purchases. The lack of follow-on 
business means there will be high variability between an item bought on one contract and 
the same item bought on a subsequent contract. If a delivered item is substandard, it may 
be months before a new contract is let to procure the same item. Consequently, the Navy 
needs higher inventory levels to compensate for the unpredictable quality of items it 
purchases. 
F. LACK OF ASSET VISffill..ITY RESULTS IN REDUNDANT 
INVENTORIES 
The Navy's inventory information system cannot access information on all items 
used by the Navy. It cannot read information on the DLA SAMMS database, the Army 
CCSS or SARSS inventory databases, or the USAF database. This can result in 
redundancies,. where inventories of joint service items are maintained by both services. 
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The services are making a significant effort to improve this deficiency. Lt. Gen 
Cusick, the Joint StaffLogistics Chief(J-4), discussed the Joint Total Asset Visibility 
(ITA V) initiative with the author. The Army is the lead service for ITAV, whose goal is 
to provide interoperability among currently stovepiped inventory systems. When fully 
implemented, IT A V will provide asset visibility "from the factory to the foxhole." The 
intent is threefold: 
1) JTA V will enable consolidation of stock points. Inventory managers can then 
reduce total inventory and cost, while improving response time. Without JTA V, 
"You can't manage what you don't know you have" (Cusick, 1996) 
2) JTAV will improve customer confidence in the supply system. When a field 
unit can electronically track its requisition all the way to the factory, supply 
personnel are less likely to hoard the item or order multiple times for the same 
requirement. 
3) JTAV will enable all services to purchase items held by another service, linking 
the currently stovepiped accounting systems. 
According to Lt. Gen Cusick, to meet these goals ITAV must be able to fulfill the 
following five requirements: 
1) Collect the data, preferably electronically through automated tags and 
laser cards. 
2) See the data, providing visibility across service boundaries. 
3) Use the data by enabling inventory managers to divert shipments and draw 
upon other service's resources. 
4) Provide help in interpreting the data. This encompasses Decision Support 
Systems, as well as help in finding substitute items and lost requisitions. 
5) Model the data through a Global Command and Control System (GCCS) that 
would enable war gaming and simulation. 
An estimated implementation date for JT A V is not yet set. 
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G. MONOPSONY INCREASES INVENTORY BY REQUIRING THE 
CUSTOMER TO STORE A LARGE PRODUCTION RUN 
Monopsony is an economic term meaning "One customer." This situation is 
inevitable for many defense items, since the exclusive use of the latest weapons and their 
support systems provide the United States with a competitive edge on the battlefield. 
This situation results in the Navy being the only purchaser for many weapons systems. 
JIT inventory systems are then impractical because JIT requires frequent delivery of small 
lot sizes, which would leave a manufacturer's production line idle much of the time. 
Under monopsony, an item's manufacturer is only going to make the item once or 
infrequently, and will be serving other customers at the same time. The manufacturer 
may be the only supplier of an item, but this firm can and usually does have other 
customers for other items. It only makes sense for the manufacturer to want to produce a 
.large lot size and then utilize its production resources on other items. This increases the 
sole customer's inventory, since it must hold more inventory than it would normally 
purchase in a competitive market environment composed of many customers. 
While monopsony is unavoidable for weapons systems, it is not necessary for 
many secondary items such as spare parts, clothing, and medical supplies. However, 
government regulations sometimes drive secondary items into this situation, resulting in 
the government being the only buyer for an item. The following four cases pinpoint how 
this can happen: 
1) "The government's use of detailed specifications often limits the 
number of potential solutions to a stated need .. relative isolation of the 
writers of military specifications from users, buyers, and the marketplace. 
The result is a breakdown in understanding user requirements and what is 
available in the marketplace." (DSMC, 1991, p. 2-5) 
2) In addition to the writers of specifications, "Acquisition personnel are not 
usually trained in how to conduct market research, surveys, and analyses. (DSMC, 
1991, p. 2-6)" Consequently, they may be unaware of how to fmd potential 
solutions to a need without procuring a government-unique item. 
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3) Government contracting sometimes functions on the exact manufacturing 
process to be followed, rather than on form, fit, and function. A commercial item 
with the same or better performance characteristics might be rejected because a 
specific process was not followed 
4) There is a cultural bias in DoD to favor new items over those available 
commercially: 
Another factor is DoD's propensity to favor (issue) guidance for new 
developments while providing relatively little guidance for procuring 
existing items. With minimum guidance to government buyers and a 
natural inclination to believe one's own requirements are unique, the 
default modus operandi is to go for new development rather than take time 
to determine whether or not something already exists that could satisfy the 
requirement (DSMC, 1991, p. 2-6) 
H. GOALS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES EMPHASIZE READINESS 
ANDREW ARD KEEPING IDGH LEVELS OF INVENTORY 
The commercial sector has the goal of satisfying customers by producing and 
delivering goods that are high quality, low cost, and quickly delivered. Logistics 
managers are rated on efficiency and response time. Although high inventory can 
improve response time by making sure goods are always available, it is costly and subject 
to obsolescence and pilferage. In the commercial sector, high levels of inventory are seen 
as an unnecessary, expensive liability. 
In contrast, Navy commanders are evaluated in terms of readiness to perform their 
operational mission. The Navy supply system supports readiness by evaluating item 
managers in terms of SMA, number of back orders, and ACWf. High levels of inventory 
improve all of these measures, and can be seen as insurance against unforeseen 
circumstances. 
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L GEOGRAPIDC DISPERSION INCREASES REPLENISHMENT 
TIMES AND INVENTORY REQUIREMENTS 
United States international commitments require Navy operating forces to be 
deployed worldwide. It is simply not possible for the users to be geographically close to 
their suppliers. Also, the government's insistence on full and open competition means 
that any firm in the country can bid on a contract. These factors increase inventory 
requirements since the replenishment time is longer. 
J. SEPARATE SERVICE TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS INCREASE 
COSTS AND INVENTORY 
All four armed services and DLA maintain their own transportation networks. 
These separate networks cannot see each other's assets or cargoes. Consequently, 
economies of scale and centralized control are not realized. This arrangement negates the 
advantages that could be gained by maintaining a common logistical system under one 
command. Inventories must be higher because the separate networks are not as efficient 
as a consolidated system would be. 
K. SUMMARY 
This chapter has shown some of the major differences between the Navy and the 
commercial sector that relate to inventory management. It has demonstrated that these 
differences frequently preclude the use of commercial logistics practices. Consequently, 
training personnel in commercial logistics practices would be pointless, since the factors 
necessary for implementation are not present. The next chapter examines whether 
training in commercial logistics practices could rectify the causes of excess inventory 
identified in Chapter IT. 
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VllL IMPACT OF TRAINING IN COMMERCIAL LOGISTICS 
PRACTICES UPON NAVY EXCESS INVENTORY 
This chapter defmes training, examines the role of training in changing 
organizational culture, and discusses whether training in commercial logistics practices 
would rectify the causes of excess inventory identified in Chapter IT. For each cause of 
excess inventory, the impact of training in commercial logistics practices is discussed 
Current DoD initiatives to improve inventory management are correlated with the cause 
of excess to which they apply. The findings are then summarized in a table. 
A. DEFINITION OF TRAINING 
There are a number of different ways to define training. Michael B. McCaskey in 
an article in the Harvard Business Review refers to training as the systematic acquisition 
of attitudes, concepts, knowledge, roles, or skills that result in the improved performance 
of work (McCaskey, 1995, p. 175). Mintzberg considers training and behavior 
formalization synonymously with achieving standardization. According to Mintzberg, 
training is the use of formalized instructional programs designed to establish and 
standardize in people the requisite skills and abilities for particular jobs in organizations. 
Behavior formalization is the system of rules, job descriptions, regulations, and 
evaluations imposed by the manager to control and evaluate performance. Combining 
the two provides a level of standardization that guides behavior toward desired outcomes 
(Mintzberg and Quinn, p.335). Organizations train their employees to increase the 
performance of their people and achieve a competitive advantage. 
B. EFFECT OF TRAINING ON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Many other factors besides training must be considered when trying to change 
organizational culture and behavioral norms. One of the most widely used models of 
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organizational behavior is that of Michael B. McCaskey of the Harvard Business School. 
Figure 8-1 is a graphic depiction of the McCaskey model as modified by Nancy Roberts, 
Professor of Management at the Naval Postgraduate School (Roberts, 1996). The 
McCaskey model first sets an organization within a context largely shaped by external 
factors. This context is then woven together with top management vision and industry-
specific key success factors to drive the organizational design. There are five 
organizational design factors: task requirements, organizational structure, technology, 
people, and process/systems including training. The combined effect of these five factors 
drives the organizational culture and management style, which then leads to outputs and 
outcomes. 
Organizational culture, including the prevalent norms and values within the 
organization, is beyond the direct control of top management. According to McCaskey, 
culture is the combined output of all five of the organizational design factors. Since 
training is only one portion of one of the design factors, a change in training may have 
little or no impact upon organizational culture and behavior. The five design factors are 
internal parameters that are under the direct control of management, but are shaped by the 
historical and external context of an organization. 
The McCaskey model represents a dynamic system where a change in any part of 
the model can lead to changes throughout the entire process. These changes may result in 
differing productivity, quality, employee satisfaction, and outcomes. They may either be 
positively reinforcing to strengthen behavior or negatively reinforcing leading to behavior 
opposite of that intended. In order to achieve a desired cultural change, all of the 
organizational design factors must be considered and balanced against one another. 
In the McCaskey model, training is not the driving factor in cultural change. 
Training is merely an enabler that conforms personnel to a culture that already exists. 
Consequently, training has not proven effective as a vehicle for changing a culture. 
Without altering the other organizational design factors, changes in training by 
themselves are unlikely to have much effect upon organizational culture and behavioral 
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stems from the external context of an organization. In such a situation, training has little 
or no impact on culture. 
C. IMP ACT OF TRAINING UPON THE CAUSES OF EXCESS INVENTORY 
Many of the causes of excess inventory are beyond the control of the item 
manager and fleet personnel. Because of this, training personnel in commercial logistics 
practices would produce little or no change in their behavior. In some cases, utilizing 
commercial logistics methods could be negatively reinforced by the current organizational 
structure and rewards system. The foll~wing paragraphs detail the impact of training 
upon each identified cause of excess inventory: 
1. Decrease in Requirements 
Decreases in requirements for an item can result in excess inventory when there is 
enough material on hand to support the older, higher requirements. A decrease in 
requirements can result from the weapons system being phased out, reliability 
improvements, a change in operational use, reduction in repair cycle time, reduction in 
administrative or production lead time, a reduction in war reserve requirements, or items 
ordered for a contingency that does not materialize. Most of these causes are external to 
the context ofNA VICP and DLA 
None of these factors would be affected by training in commercial logistics 
practices. In fact, POP and long term contracting arrangements might make this situation 
worse. Both reduce the administrative lead time needed for replenishment, thus more 
inventory would then be labeled as excess. 
Training the NA VICP IWST and the weapons system Program Offices to 
understand each other's priorities and anticipate each other's operations, coupled with 
improved communication between the two offices, might reduce the generation of excess 
inventory. For instance, if a Program Office knows the schedule at which a weapons 
systems will be phased out, they could communicate this to the NA VICP IWST, possibly 
reducing or averting a procurement action. If the fleet has now changed the operational 
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use of an item reducing its demand, the same scenario applies. IflWST equipment 
specialists know of reliability improvements that should reduce demand, NA VICP could 
reduce initial procurements and communicate this to the Program Office. By working 
together, these two groups could eliminate the deleterious impact of their actions upon 
each other. 
2. Receiving the Wrong Consumable Part 
There are two basic causes of receiving the wrong part: ordering it incorrectly or 
having the supply activity pick the wrong item off the shelf A unit may order the wrong 
part because of a keypunch error, or poor manuals or technical assistance. A supply 
activity may have inaccurate stock location files that could result in parts being out of 
their proper location. 
Training in commercial logistics practices would not resolve this cause of excess. 
None of the commercial practices apply if personnel are ordering the wrong part or have 
inaccurate data files. Basic procedural training might reduce the frequency of ordering 
the wrong part. As discussed in the previous chapter, comprehensive formal training will 
most likely be forgotten before it is put to use. Given the dynamic and diverse nature of 
AK/SK fleet job assignments, ongoing unit level training would be best suited to resolve 
this problem. 
Microchip Technology for Logistics Application/ Radio Frequency (MITLAIRF) 
is an electronic tracking system that records the precise identification of items by radio 
frequency inventory. This has the potential to detect if the part being shipped does not 
match the requisition. However, if the part is tagged incorrectly, MITLAIRF would not 
help. 
3. Lack of Asset Visibility 
An inability of the Navy, DLA, and the other services to see each other's 
inventories can result in redundancy. A service may buy an item which another service is 
holding unused in a warehouse (Department of Defense Joint Staff, 1996, p. 5). 
Training would not help this situation in any way. There is a saying that "You 
can't manage what you can't measure," and that is certainly true here. As discussed in 
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the previous chapter, the services are on track to implementing ITAV.- Until that becomes 
a reality, the lack of asset visibility will have the potential to generate excess inventory. 
There are also differences in the services' accounting systems that need to be 
reconciled to enable cross-service purchases. The Defense Financial Accounting Service 
(DFAS) was created in 1991 to standardize policy and operations in service accounting 
systems. To date, it has reduced the volume of accounting regulations by 88%. DF AS 
intends to have all services using a common accounting system by 2002. Standardization 
and improvements wrought by DF AS will be included in IT A V. 
4. Lack of Customer Confidence 
Operating forces sometimes do not have confidence in the ability of the supply 
system to support them, so they hoard items, and deliberately order more than they need. 
This stems from a philosophy of "Readiness at Any Cost." A peacetime military is 
primarily evaluated in terms of readiness and unit commanders sometimes try to boost 
readiness through holding additional inventory. 
Training could help this issue at the unit level. Supply personnel already know 
that reordering a part will not make it arrive any faster. Warfighters need to know the 
same information. Ideally, receiving acknowledgement that a requisition is in good status 
and being processed will stop multiple orders, and hoarding will be minimized. However, 
command influence will continue to make this cause of excess a problem until the supply 
system demonstrates that it can reliably meet the needs of deployed forces, and the culture 
of"Readiness at any cost" is changed. 
IT A V has the potential to reduce this cause of excess. Having visibility of a 
command's requisitions "From the factory to the foxhole" (Cusick, 1996) should improve 
the confidence of operating units in their supply support. 
5. Base Realignment and Closure (BRA C) 
As force structures contract and bases are closed or realigned under BRAC, 
demand will decline and cause excess inventory. In addition, closing a base almost 
always results in identifying inventory that is not on the accountability records. This has 
happened repeatedly as DLA and the services have closed distribution depots. 
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There is no type of training that would reduce this cause of excess, since BRAC 
actions are external to the context of DoD. BRAC decisions are made by a bipartisan 
Congressional panel that tries to reduce the impact of the defense Drayton upon both the 
military and the civilian community. Reducing the generation of excess inventory is not a 
high priority for the BRAC commission when compared to their role in reshaping 
America's military. 
Basic procedural training at the unit level may reduce the incidence of mis-
identified stock in the future. Performing regular wall-to-wall inventories is vital to 
ensure that physical inventories match stock location records. However, this will not 
alleviate the excess inventory caused by poor identification in the past. MTILA has the 
potential to identifY all inventory present in a warehouse and could pinpoint items not on 
an accountability list. However, if the part was tagged incorrectly MTILA would not 
help. 
6. Support of Allies 
Support of our allies sometimes forces the United States to hold items that appear 
to be excess. These may be from FMS contracts or from regional agreements. The 
United States often sells different configurations of a weapons system to different 
countries, and then must maintain inventory on each separate configuration. Nations that 
purchase United States weapons frequently do not purchase all of the necessary spare 
parts up front. Since the United States is the sole source for these items, DoD must 
maintain inventory, sometimes on weapons that United States forces no longer use. 
Regional agreements also result in the United States holding stock needed for the defense 
of another nation. 
Training will not reduce this cause of excess. Support of allies is external to the 
DoD organizational context. Both FMS contracts and regional agreements are political 
issues that can only be resolved at the highest levels of the Department of State and 
Department of Defense. Maintenance of what appears to be excess inventory is 
sometimes necessary to support foreign policy objectives. No amount of personnel 
training will change political reality. 
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7. Poor Estimates of Support Required for Initial Procurement 
When a new weapons system is fielded, the initial estimates of which components 
will break and how often come from the contractor in an Interim Support List (ILS). 
There is currently no incentive for the contractor to limit the size of the ISL, since they 
profit from each additional item they can include on it. The ISL is generated external to 
the context of DoD inventory management structure. 
Training would not reduce the generation of excess from this cause. Contractor 
data drives the purchase of spare parts. Until real usage data supplants the ISL estimate 
over the course of several years of operational use, the Navy purchases based upon a 
contractor engineer's projections and guesses. 
There is an initiative that might reduce generation of excess inventory from this 
cause. The Navy is developing a program under which the contractor would be 
responsible for all spare parts support for the first two to five years of a weapons system 
introduction. Only after sufficient operational demand data has been established would 
the Navy take over responsibility for weapons system parts support. This initiative would 
greatly reduce the generation of excess from a poor estimate of required support, since the 
contractor would have no incentive to increase the IS. (Waite, 1996) 
8. Demilitarization 
Old military equipment must be demilitarized before it can be either sold or 
disposed. The funding comes out of Operations and Maintenance (0 & M) dollars, which 
are the same dollars the services use to pay for current operations. In this time of 
increasingly tight funding, there is simply not enough priority to pay for demilitarization 
of old equipment when the services need the money for today' s operations. 
Training would have no impact upon this issue. Demilitarization and its funding 
are external to the organizational context of DoD. The inability to demilitarize excess 
equipment is a budgeting problem, and no amount of training will resolve it. 
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9. Item Manager Incentives 
A full discussion of item manager incentives is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
This section will touch on how the performance measures used to evaluate item managers 
result in dysfunctional behavior. There is a saying that "That which gets rewarded gets 
done." The author's observation is that this maxim holds true in inventory management 
NA VICP and DLA have tried many different performance measures throughout the years 
to evaluate item managers. These measures have resulted in behavioral changes, but have 
not improved the system to reach the desired goal of maximum readiness at minimal cost 
(Nixon and Wolfe, 1996). Table 7 shows some of the performance measures that have 
been used to evaluate inventory managers, and the resultant behaviors. 
Performance Measure Resulting Item Manager Behavior 
Supply Material Availability (SMA) Keep higher inventories 
Average Customer Wait Time (ACWT) Cancel documents that cannot be filled 
quickly 
Number ofBackorders Cancel documents that cannot be filled 
quickly 
Number of orders shipped I) Split large orders into many small 
orders 
2) Ship small orders first 
Pounds of Material Shipped Ship large or heavy orders first 
Table 7. Performance Measures That Have Been Used to Evaluate Inventory Managers 
and the Resulting Behaviors 
The primary measures of effectiveness of an item manager (SMA, ACWT, and 
Number ofBackorders) all promote readiness and do not address the creation or retention 
of excess material. Both in the Navy and DLA, item managers perceive that the worst 
thing they can do short of breaking the law is to run out of stock on an item. (Brennan, 
Coyle, Panetta, and Pero, 1996, and Nixon and Wolfe, 1996) 
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Training in commercial logistics practices would not improve this situation. In 
fact, under the current DLA funding arrangement, ill is discouraged because it costs 
more than traditional inventory methods. DLA activities have a transaction charge of 
roughly $33 per line item, regardless of quantity. The frequent deliveries of small 
quantities with a ill system can result in higher costs to the item manager. In addition, 
until recently there was little incentive to get rid of excess inventory. Since there was no 
storage cost to hold the material but a $33 transaction charge to move it, item managers 
were incentivized to keep their excess. 
In 1995, DLA began charging for covered storage at the rate of$5.15 per square 
foot per year (GAO/NSIAD-95-64, 1995, p. 16). Non-warehouse storage is cheaper, 
roughly one dollar per square foot per year for shed storage and 30 cents per square foot 
per year for outdoor storage (Estes, Miller, Rosenberry, and Snyder, 1996). This measure 
has the potential to remove excess from storage, since it will be much more expensive to 
keep it than to transfer it to DRMO for reutilization. 
10. Economic Considerations 
Warehouses that hold part of the National Stockpile cannot sell or dispose of these 
items by law. In addition, selling some of these items has the potential to devastate 
markets that would be flooded by the abundant supply. Consequently, the military simply 
maintains its stocks of these commodities. 
Training would not improve this issue in any way. The National Stockpile is a 
matter of public law that is completely external to the DoD organizational context. Only 
legislation can reduce this cause of excess. 
11. Contracting Regulations 
Unlike the private sector, the government must comply with the provisions of the 
Competition In Contracting Act (CICA) and other regulations designed to promote equity 
and social goals in government contracting. These requirements add months to the 
contracting process, thus increasing the reorder point since more stock is needed to cover 
demand during the replenishment period. The F ASA of 1994 attempted to address this 
issue, but its effects have yet to be felt. 
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Training in commercial logistics practices has some potential to improve this area. 
There are several initiatives currently underway. One is the Navy's Prime Vendor 
program, where contractors are responsible for supplying and delivering all inventory to 
fleet centers. This program is currently in place to support all TH-57 Ranger inventory, 
as well as C-130 propeller blades. 
Another active initiative is the Direct Vendor Delivery (DVD) program. This 
program has vendors ship items directly to the operating forces, without passing through 
a Navy or DLA warehouse. As of July 1996, 11 percent ofDSCR requisitions and 22 
percent ofDSCR sales volume used DVD (Bailey, 1996). 
Table 8 gives a brief synopsis of the findings of this section. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has demonstrated that training in commercial logistics practices 
would have little impact on the excess inventories currently in DoD. The McCaskey 
model shows that training is only one of five organizational design factors in Defense 
inventory management. Training has limited utility in changing behavioral norms when 
the other factors of organizational design (task requirements, people, structure, 
technology, and processes/systems) remain unchanged. Training is most effective as an 
enabler to conform personnel to a culture that already exists. It has not proven effective 
as a vehicle for changing culture. Training is completely ineffective in changing behavior 
when the reason for the behavior comes from outside the organizational context. 
This chapter has discussed the impact of training on the causes of excess 
inventory identified in Chapter ll. Most of the causes of excess are outside the 
organizational context of DoD inventory management, and would thus be unaffected by 
training. Several other causes might be affected by some form of training, but not 
training in commercial logistics practices. Only in the area of contracting regulations 
does training in commercial logistics practices have some potential to improve Navy 
inventory management. The next chapter presents conclusions and recommendations. 
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Cause of excess Would Would any H training- would help, 
inventory training in type of what kind of training, and 
commercial training to whom? 
logistics reduce this 
practices cause of 
reduce this excess? 
cause of 
excess? 
Decrease in No Yes Training IWST and 
requirements Program Office to 
understand each other and 
work together 
Receiving the wrong No Yes Basic procedural training 
consumable part for fleet SKI AK 
Lack of asset No No 
visibility 
Lack of customer No Yes Supply principles training 
confidence for unit commanders 
BRAC No No Basic procedural training 
for fleet AK/SK may reduce 
this problem in the future 
Support of allies No No 
Poor estimates of No No 
support required for 
initial procurement 
Demilitarization No No 
Item Manager No Yes Training Item Managers to 
incentives understand the impact of 
their actions on the system 
Economic No No 
Considerations 
Contracting Yes Yes Long Term Contracting and 
Regulations Direct Vendor Delivery 
Training for Item Managers 
Table 8. Impact of Training Upon the Causes of Excess Inventory 
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has examined the issue of whether training in commercial logistics 
practices would benefit Navy inventory management of secondary items. It has listed the 
primary causes of excess inventory; discussed how inventory managers at NA VICP, 
DLA, and in the fleet are currently trained; and examined how those inventory managers 
apply their training. The thesis then looked at commercial practices, the factors necessary 
for their implementation, and discussed whether these practices could be effective in a 
government setting. Chapter VIII then tied this information together, showing how the 
causes of excess inventory would in most cases be unaffected by training. Now follows 
the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Training in Commercial Logistics Practices Will Not Significantly 
Improve Navy Inventory Management of Secondary Items 
Most of the causes of excess inventory are unrelated to training. Issues such as a 
lack of asset visibility, lack of customer confidence, support of allies, demilitarization, 
BRAC, and economic considerations have no connection to the training of inventory 
managers. A training program in commercial logistics practices, no matter how well 
constructed, would have no impact on these causes of excess inventory. 
Several other causes of excess might be affected by training, but not training in 
commercial logistics practices. The consequences of a decrease in requirements for an 
item might be partially averted by training the weapons system Program Office and 
NA VICP IWST to understand each other's priorities and capabilities and to work 
together. Excess caused by receiving the wrong consumable part can be reduced with 
better on-the-job training of supply personnel in the fleet Excess caused by poor 
estimates of support required for initial procurement can be alleviated with some of the 
initiatives discussed in the last chapter, such as making the contractor responsible for all 
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parts support for the first several years of a weapon's system introduction. This would of 
course need to be balanced against the national security risk involved in carrying a 
reduced inventory of spares for a first-line weapons system. 
Only in the area of contracting regulations does training in commercial logistics 
practices have potential to reduce excess inventory. This cause of excess is largely self-
inflicted, thus the government has the ability to change its policies to reduce the 
generation and retention of excess inventory. The FASA of 1994 reduced some of the 
burdensome requirements of government contracting, making it easier to buy quality 
products and develop long-term relationships. Prime Vendor and Direct Vendor Delivery 
are two initiatives currently underway that can reduce inventory. 
2. Many Commercial Logistics Practices Are Simply Inappropriate for 
the Navy 
Because of the tremendous differences between the Navy and the private sector, 
commercial practices such as llT just will not work in the Navy. Factors such as unstable 
demand, huge stockout cost, and geographic dispersion preclude the use of many logistics 
practices that have proven so successful in the commercial sector. These factors cannot __ 
be changed, since they are inherent to being a military entity of a worldwide maritime 
power. 
3. Organizational Culture Is Too Complex to Be Accomplished by 
Changing One Variable 
Training is only one of the inputs to organizational behavior. An organization's 
basic design derives from its external context and its mission! vision/strategy. Internal to 
the organization, training is combined with structure, reward systems, people, and 
management/control systems to produce the organizational culture, which then drives the 
outputs. Trying to alter a culture by changing only one of these variables is usually a 
wasted effort. In the case of inventory management, the current mission, structure, 
reward systems, and management and control systems all promote behaviors which do 
not reduce generation of excess inventory. If personnel were trained in using commercial 
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practices designed to reduce inventory, it would have little or no effect, -because the other 
elements of organizational design oppose it. 
4. DoD is on the Right Track with Many of its Initiatives 
Many causes of excess inventory are beyond the ability of DoD to control. For 
those it can control, DoD has made good efforts to improve its logistical system. IT A V, 
DVD, and initiatives to make contractors responsible for the first several years of 
weapons system parts support can result in lower inventories. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Full Speed Ahead with JTA V 
IT A V is critical to the success of militaty inventory management. It is impossible 
to effectively manage inventory without knowing exactly what items are stored and where 
they are stored. IT A V is the enabler to improving customer confidence in the supply 
system's ability to support deployed forces. 
2. Continue the Standardization of Accounting Systems 
IT A V' s effectiveness will be diminished if cross-service purchases of items are 
not possible because of differing accounting systems. DF AS has made good headway in 
reducing duplication of the services' accounting systems. DFAS should press on with 
these efforts, so that IT A V can be truly effective. 
3. Secretary of Defense Should Standardize the Def'mition of Excess 
Inventory 
All four armed services and DLA use a different definition of excess inventory. 
The Navy definition is a protection level plus eight years consumption at current rates. 
The Army uses a protection level plus one EOQ. DLA uses six years consumption at 
current rates with no protection levels. The Air Force and Marine Corps definitions are 
different from all of the above. 
In addition to differing on the number of items considered excess, the services 
also differ on the valuation of these items. Sometimes a service uses the current purchase 
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price, sometimes the original purchase price, and at other times the salvage value. 
Standardizing the definition of excess and its method of valuation would enable 
consistent measurement of total DoD excess inventory, and provide a benchmark for 
future improvements. 
4. NA VICP Should Standardize Training for Navy Item Managers 
Currently, there are no training requirements necessary to become an item 
manager. NA VICP Academy is voluntary. As a result, there is wide variation in the 
knowledge base, skill levels, and priorities ofNavy item managers. The author 
recommends a mandatory extended ICP Academy for all item managers prior to assuming 
their position, followed by PQS and a formal mentoring program. This initiative would 
help standardize skills, policies, and procedures throughout NA VICP. Both the Army and 
DLA have such a program in place, and they have found it beneficial. The extended ICP 
Academy would cover all basic skills needed to become an item manager, and would 
include the computer skills necessary to execute these tasks. 
5. DLA Should Teach a Comprehensive Computer Skills Course for 
the Supply Asset Material Management System (SAMMS) 
Currently, the DLA courses for SAMMS are fragmented and have little 
connection to each other. Each covers only a specific skill. A comprehensive computer 
course would enable DLA item managers to effectively utilize the entire SAMMS system, 
directly improving their efficiency. 
6. NA V AIR, NAVSEA, and NA VICP Should Teach the Program Offices 
and IWST about Each Other's Operations and Priorities 
Training the NA VICP IWST and the weapons system Program Offices to 
understand each other's priorities and anticipate each other's operations, coupled with 
improved communication between the two offices, might reduce generation of excess. 
For instance, if a Program Office knows the schedule at which a weapons systems will be 
phased out, they could communicate this to the NA VICP IWST, possibly reducing or 
averting a procurement action. If the fleet changes the operational use of an item, thus 
reducing its demand, the same scenario applies. IfiWST equipment specialists know of 
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reliability improvements that should reduce demancL NA VICP could reduce initial 
procurements and communicate this to the Program Office. By working together, these 
two groups could eliminate the deleterious impact of their actions upon each other. 
7. CNO Should Institute Supply Principles Indoctrination as Part of 
Unit Commander Training, and Reinforce the Importance of 
Logistics in Battle Planning 
Logistics support and its proper application are critical to battlefield success. Unit 
commanders are experts in strategy and tactics, but often lack sufficient knowledge of 
logistics and supply principles. The emphasis on logistics in unit commander training 
should be increased. However, as this thesis has shown, training alone is not the answer. 
It needs to be coupled with changes in other organizational design factors such as reward 
systems and management /control systems to be effective. This combination should 
alleviate some of the excess inventory caused by hoarding or multiple ordering. 
8. Congress Should Conduct a Review of the National Stockpile 
The National Stockpile was created years ago to ensure the self-sufficiency of the 
United States in wartime. Since that time, warfare has radically changed and the United 
States is now dependent on truly global trade to support its interests. Meanwhile, the 
National Stockpile has remained largely unchanged. It often holds items that are 
appropriate to the warfare of generations ago. A comprehensive review by Congress is in 
order. Many of these items are no longer critical to national security, while there may be 
other items not currently held that should be. 
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